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Preface 
This dissertation can be read on several levels. First, it is a report on a collaborative 
project between the Computer Science Department (specifically the Software 
Engineering Program) and the Humanities Department (specifically the Rhetoric and 
Technical Communication Program) to develop case studies that focus on issues of 
communication in the workplace, and the results of the use of them in the classroom. My 
argument here is that through case study teaching we are simulating real-world 
experience in a meaningful way, essentially developing a teachable way of developing 
phronesis, the reasoned capacity to act for the good in public. 
 
Second, it can be read as a ―how-to‖ guide relating how the construction of those case 
studies came about in an effort to assist any educator who may wish to construct their 
own case studies. To that end, I have included a discussion of the ethnographic 
methodologies employed, and how it was adapted to our more pragmatic ends.  
 
Finally, I present my overarching argument for a new appraisal of the concept of techné. 
This reappraisal emphasizes its productive activity, poiesis, rather than focusing on its 
knowledge, the reasoned capacity to make, as has been the case in the past. I propose that 
focusing on the telos, the end outside the production, contributes to, the diminishment, if 
not complete foreclosure, of a rich concept of techné.  
 
As mentioned above, much of the development of the case studies was a collaborative 
project involving faculty, graduate, and undergraduate students from the Computer 
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Science and Humanities Departments. The faculty members involved were thanked in my 
acknowledgments, and the graduate and undergraduate students are acknowledged in the 
text where appropriate. Due to this collaborative nature, I have use the pronoun ―we‖ 
when the interactions were a group effort, and reserved ―I‖ for my individual 
contributions.  
 
Some previously published material that appears in this dissertation includes selections 
from Speaking of Software: Case Studies in Software Communication, which I 
coauthored with Ann Brady, Marika Seigel and Charles Wallace (2008) and which 
appeared in Software Engineering: Effective Teaching and Learning Approaches and 
Practice. Though written in a largely collaborative manner, my primary contribution was 
to the construction and presentation of the cases, and the adaptation of the ethnographic 
methods I used. The permission from the publisher, IGI Global, to reuse this material can 
be found in Appendix 2. Other previously published material includes selections from 
―Making and Acting: Ethnographic Development of a Case Study Approach‖ for which I 
was first author, and also represents a collaborative effort with Marika Seigel and Charles 
Wallace. This first appeared in Technical Communication in 2008, and was reprinted in 
Qualitative Research in Technical Communication in 2011. This appears in modified 
form in Chapter Three: Theory Applied and Chapter Five: Project specific Methods. 
Permission from Technical Communication was not required as the authors retained 
rights. Permission from the publisher, Routledge, was obtained. Statements concerning 
both can also be found in Appendix 2. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation is a report on a collaborative project between the Computer Science and 
the Humanities Departments to develop case studies that focus on issues of 
communication in the workplace, and the results of their use in the classroom. My 
argument is that case study teaching simulates real-world experience in a meaningful 
way, essentially developing a teachable way of developing phronesis, the reasoned 
capacity to act for the good in public. 
 
In addition, it can be read as a ―how-to‖ guide for educators who may wish to construct 
their own case studies. To that end, I have included a discussion of the ethnographic 
methodologies employed, and how it was adapted to our more pragmatic ends.  
 
Finally, I present my overarching argument for a new appraisal of the concept of techné. 
This reappraisal emphasizes its productive activity, poiesis, rather than focusing on its 
knowledge as has been the case in the past. I propose that focusing on the telos, the end 
outside the production, contributes to the diminishment, if not complete foreclosure, of a 
rich concept of techné. 
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Introduction 
At many universities that focus on science, engineering or other technical fields of 
endeavor, the technical communication classroom has long been where students who 
pursue degrees outside the liberal arts acquire their writing skills. Responding to a 
perceived lack of writing ability on the part of their graduates, in the early 1900‘s 
engineering schools developed these dedicated writing courses, usually in alliance with 
English departments. Basically prescriptive, these courses followed a ―forms‖ approach 
that taught the correct way to put together memos, letters, and reports. Responding to the 
instrumental methods common in the textbooks of the day, Miller (1979) has called for a 
more humanistic approach, one that includes considerations of civic responsibility and 
social action for the public good—phronesis. Dunne (1993) has also sought a more 
phronetic approach in the realm of teacher education, specifically to counter the 
behaviorist emphasis on quantifiable results that was becoming prevalent(and can still be 
seen)  in the school systems.  
 
The difficulty that arises when advocating for a phronetic pedagogy is that phronesis can 
not be taught directly. Phronesis, a ―reasoned state of capacity to act‖ (NE 1140a4), is a 
wisdom acquired through habituation and gained through experience (NE 1142a14). The 
purpose of this research is to explore ways that have been suggested to facilitate training 
in phronesis. The point of this training is to shorten the time required for students to 
come to an understanding of their civic responsibility in their classroom, in their worlds 
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of work, and in their communities. To that end, I present a method that has been shown to 
be efficacious in the classroom. By using techné and its action poiesis, educators can 
successfully simulate the years of experience normally required to acquire the capacity 
for good action in public—phronesis, as envisioned by Aristotle—within the time frame 
of a semester or less. 
 
Unlike phronesis, techné, ―a reasoned state of capacity to make‖ (NE 1140a5), can be 
taught. Janet Atwill (Janet M Atwill 1993; Janet Atwill and Lauer 1995; Janet M Atwill 
1998) has called for this kind of a production-based approach to teaching writing, seeking 
to revitalize techné. Unfortunately, as her reliance on logon techné (art of discourse) 
might suggest, she eventually advocates for a style based more on phronesis than on 
techné, one that relies on good actions, in public, with others. When she teams with 
Lauer, they seem to diminish, if not ignore the full, rich capability of the technite, the 
person who possesses and deploys the knowledge of techné. Relying on what I will later 
argue is imperfect interpretations of Aristotle (NE 1140a5-15, Rhetoric 1358b), they 
claim that the ―end of an art is not a product, but the use made of the artistic construct‖ 
(29).  They impoverish the actions which make up techné in favor of the actions of the 
user, the recipient of the result of those actions. They suggest that it is only that result, the 
end outside of the action of techné, which has value.  
 
Similarly Dubinsky (2002), in his attempt to define techné as something other than 
―knack‖, relies on the idea of working toward the communal good as his ―tempering 
agent‖. Like Mitcham (1994), Dubinsky‘s concept of techné becomes very unflattering to 
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the working technite, suggesting that carving wood is ―simple‖: more technique than 
techné. 
 
It is these and other promulgations of a diminished or impoverished techné that have 
stood in the way of a techné-based pedagogy. These imperfect forms of techné are 
described quite well by Wild (1941) as his inversion, which separates the maker from the 
made. Heidegger (1953) expands this to include the separation of people from the 
technology they create, and sees the thing made as constituting standing reserve—with 
dire consequences. de Certeau (1984) lays this problem at the feet of the engineer, who 
―takes‖ the techné from the artisan and installs it in a machine, leaving only implicitly 
known stories and fables to guide the day-to-day actions of artists and craftspeople. Many 
modern artists and craftspeople are no longer technites in the full, rich sense of the term. 
They have lost, in a sense, the ability to explain themselves.  
 
A pedagogy rooted in techné requires the recovery of a richer notion of techné, one which 
draws on both theory and personal experience. Key to this notion will be the concept of 
poiesis (making). This richer notion must consider the four causes attributed to Aristotle, 
(Physics, 194b, 23-35) with particular attention to the final cause. Unfortunately, as we 
will see with Atwill and Lauer, this is commonly seen only as an end outside the making 
(telos); outside the activity of poiesis.   
 
Activity is central to both phronesis and techné, usually termed praxis and poiesis 
respectively.  Unfortunately, these terms are often used loosely. Praxis can be any action, 
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despite its usual connection with phronesis. Poiesis is generally associated with techné as 
a more precise usage. For Aristotle, it is the action of techné: it is production, or the 
making of (usually) some thing.  It is the end of the action that determines its importance 
both as product and as use in a specific application. 
 
As acknowledged by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics ―a certain difference is found 
among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce 
them‖ (NE 1094a 3-5). As product, ergon is often overlooked in favor of the telos, the 
end outside the work, the purpose the product is used for. By restoring the intrinsic value 
of the product as ergon, we acknowledge and celebrate the achievement of the technite in 
the work itself, and at the same time respect the needs and opinions of the end user. I call 
this a techné of phronesis: a reasoned capacity to make which is informed by a reasoned 
capacity to act. The significance of this move is that where phronesis cannot explain 
itself to those without phronesis, and is generally unsupported by theory (being more of a 
situational and kairotic display of knowledge), and the impoverished forms of techné 
devalue the maker leading to a mere technique that admits no civic involvement, techné 
in its rich form promises both.      
 
 Can we educate students in a way that completes Aristotle‘s somewhat contradictory 
prescriptions that we need experience as well as theory (Meta 981a1), all in a manner that 
can explain itself discursively and be useful in the world? I believe it is in poiesis, the 
activity of making, that these can come together. For students in the classroom, and their 
instructors, poiesis can provide a framework for reflection that is complex and satisfying; 
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it suffers none of the lacks of either an impoverished techné or an unexplainable (hence 
unteachable) phronesis. Working with the rich conceptions of poiesis provided by Wild 
and Heidegger allows for the inclusion of the action and ethical implications that are 
involved with any act of production in a way that other methods do not. Poiesis 
incorporates an internal end that values the maker as well as an external end important to 
the community or, as Aristotle frames it, the good of the state (NE 1094b 5-10). A model 
based on poiesis will be significant in that it can provide a framework that can hold and 
guide the reflections of both master and apprentice. 
 
The difficulty with a pedagogy based on poiesis is that often educators can not 
accommodate all students with ―real world‖ making. Three ways of providing the 
experience of the workplace are in common use: internships, class-based projects, and 
case studies. Internships or co-ops, arguably the most real of workplace experiences, 
often occur relatively late in a student‘s college experience. They may become frustrated, 
disillusioned, or worse: discover that the career path they have been pursuing is not really 
―for them.‖ Class-based projects where the students work for a client suffer the same 
dilemma in that they are often presented in upper-division courses. In addition, they are 
often less than adequate simulations of real experience: they are often seen as 
―superficial‖ by the students (Freedman et al. 1994), and confounded by misdirection by 
the ―clients‖ (Blakeslee 1997; 2001). It is better to expose the students to the ethical 
dilemmas and political realities they may face early; in an introductory course. It is there 
that we must simulate that ―real world‖ experience if we wish to do the best by our 
students. 
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Case study teaching methods provide a third means of simulating real-world experience. 
The stories that make up case studies can capture the essence of everyday situations. 
Aristotle‘s claim that stories can be ―an imitation…of action and life‖ (Poetics 1450a17-
18) provides grounds for  Martha Nussbaum (2001), in Fragility of Goodness, to agree 
with Aristotle that ―imitation is natural‖ and that it is through imitation that we learn 
(Poetics 1448b; 5-9). Well made assignments with their basis in rich, detailed case 
studies can fill an educators desire to simulate the experiences of others, and enable 
educators to present those simulations (and dilemmas) to their students. When students 
first analyze then reflect on a case, they bring their knowledge to discursive 
consciousness. When students can put into words the lessons of the case, and explain the 
reasons for their decisions, they will have acquired the craft, the techné of what they do. 
This gives them the ability to teach their new-found capabilities, further reinforcing the 
learning of themselves and others. And that craft will become, as Brady (2007) found,  
their guide ―as they investigate knowledge that changes from one social context to 
another, one community to another, one practice to another‖ (16), a guide that will allow 
them to better cope with the workplace. 
 
Although there is much ―how-to‖ material on case studies available, such as 
Wasserman‘s Introduction to Case Method Teaching(1994), Rosson and Carroll‘s 
textbook Usability Engineering: Scenario-Based Development of Human Computer 
Interaction and the associated Usability Case Study Tool (http://ucs.ist.psu.edu), the work 
of Herreid (1997a) and others (available at the National Center for the Teaching of Case 
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Studies in Science), and some reporting in the IEEE journal (notably, the Transactions on 
Professional Communication December 2004 special issue on case studies) , it appears 
there is a lack of theoretically grounded work in this area. There is also a history of case 
study use in technical communications to explore and educate, exemplified by Zoetewey 
and  Staggers‘ (2004) ―Midwest Air Disaster‖ case, that could benefit from more explicit 
theoretical underpinnings . Included in this section is learning theory as it applies in the 
classroom. Freedman and Adam (1996) have shown the usefulness of Lave and Wenger‘s  
(1991) ―legitimate peripheral participation‖, Rogoff‘s (2008) ―guided participation‖, and 
Vygotsky‘s apprenticeship models of learning.  
 
To this end I have created two rich, detailed case studies in conjunction with the 
Computer Science and Humanities departments at Michigan Technological University. 
Sponsored by a National Science Foundation grant, I worked for three years to gather 
ethnographic data and write up the cases. I also supervised and contributed to the creation 
of other cases, all available at http://www.speaksoft.mtu.edu/cases/.  
 
To begin, I provide some background on the two projects that led to the development and 
use of the first case. Initially, I worked with the Computer Science Department at 
Michigan Technological University to gather the ethnographic material that would 
eventually be used to develop the case. I then worked with the Humanities Department as 
the case used in Technical Communication courses, and again with Computer Science as 
it was used in Software Engineering courses.    
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In chapter two I offer explication of the concepts of techné and phronesis, and their 
aligned actions of poiesis and praxis. I review how they have been interpreted, and 
sometimes misinterpreted, by scholars from various fields, and suggestions of how they 
have been used, or might be used, in pedagogical approaches. 
 
Chapter two also theorizes how those concepts informed construction of the cases. Since 
they are critical to our pedagogical goals of helping students to create documents (the 
making, or techné aspect) that are ethical and promote the common good inherent in any 
situation (the acting, or phronesis aspect), we seek to share our method of developing 
these rich, compelling cases, and demonstrate how our goals have been accomplished 
through their use. I believe that if the concepts of making and acting are not understood 
and intentionally incorporated at the beginning of development of the cases, then they 
will be present in only the most tangential of ways, unnecessarily complicating the 
discovery process of the students.  
 
 
Chapter three examines the use of one ethnographically based Speaking of Software case 
study in a classroom, again using techné and phronesis as a theoretical lens. This initial 
use of the Seabase case study was in a technical communication course comprised of 
students majoring in technical communication, business, engineering, as well as software 
engineering and computer science. While the Seabase case study has also been used with 
success in a Software Engineering classroom, here I report only on the use in the 
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Technical Communication class predominately due to its more heterogeneous 
composition. 
 
 The case studies we developed from the student projects have also been used in other 
classrooms, with initially good reception. I also report on two of those trials, showing 
how the concepts of techné and phronesis are ―rediscovered‖ by students when the cases 
are ultimately deployed in the classroom. These examples demonstrate our method of 
using ethnography not just for research, but to train (T. Miller 1991).   
 
In chapter four I review the ethnographic methods used to create the cases. I have 
followed two Software Engineering student capstone projects through the Computer 
Science department (CS), one internal (Maze) and one external (Crane, with Mechanical 
Engineering).  Access to these sites was with the permission of all involved, and has 
returned some rich data on interaction between client and student. My fieldwork 
consisted primarily of observation and interviews. As a research assistant with CS, I 
followed the students as they worked on their Senior Design Projects for clients both 
outside and inside their major. I gathered data on how they navigated client interactions 
and developed case studies based on the process. I believe these ―thick descriptions‖ 
provide fertile ground for beginning an investigation of how students learn a new genre. 
Judicious coding of these descriptions following the methods described by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) was used to develop themes that were then verified with the participants. It 
became an iterative process that is, as Charmaz (2005) describes, more constructivist than 
the original grounded theory allows. 
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Chapter five provides project specific methods we used to develop the cases. Our work 
was not initially a true ethnography in that we did not spend years doing fieldwork with 
the intent of explicating a culture. Rather, we adapted proven ethnographic techniques to 
inquire into specific communication issues. This chapter provides a road mop forothers 
who may wish to embark on a similar project. 
 
Chapter six concludes the discussion of the pedagogical aspects of this work. I propose 
poiesis as a valuable operative agent in a techné-based pedagogy; an agent that can 
include acting well with others even as it guides production. Finally I discuss the 
implications of this proposal to writing classroom pedagogy, and offer some 
recommendations on their application to current and future practice. 
 
That said, my pragmatic inquiry concerned how to simulate experience in a classroom.  
I have developed one technique that does just that. Drawing on a rich notion of techné 
(and its activity poiesis) has provided the ground for first developing the simulation as a 
case study. Once in use in the classroom, these concepts also allowed for theorizing its 
use by the students. That is, I was able, by using responses to the simulation, confirm the 
value of my technique.  I have, in essence, created a teachable knowledge of how-to-act, 
in effect creating a techné of phronesis.  
 
Chapter seven offers a second conclusion that details the poietical aspects of this work. 
Having been a technite (of auto repair) for many years, I have an implicit understanding 
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(gained through experience) of techné, and its activity of poiesis, that many do not 
possess. I have made this understanding more explicit, explain it, brought it to ―discursive 
consciousness‖ if you will. In doing so I have fleshed out in almost autoethnographic 
form what I have provisionally called a rich techné. But the limitation of many 
autoethnographies is their focus on the particular. By examining and writing in the 
experience of others, initially those of the Senior Design Projects I followed, I have 
uncovered practical examples of the more universal aspects of techné. Theorized in these 
instances as well, this work is a first step in rewriting our field‘s more common 
understanding of techné in an ―impoverished‖ sense.  Using this rich notion of techné as 
it is found in the classroom and the workplace, I provide an experiential account of a 
―techné of phronesis‖, and how that concept is inseparable from poiesis, and further 
demonstrate its value in pedagogical applications. 
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Chapter One: Background 
This chapter discusses the more practical aspects of the project that contributed to the 
creation of this dissertation. Initially, the focus was to develop pedagogical material for 
use in undergraduate software engineering classrooms. Specifically, the desire was to 
create what might be called ―thick descriptions‖, that is, case studies that would introduce 
beginning students to real-world software development issues and the communications 
that surround—and sometimes create—those issues. A second thrust was to investigate 
how a case study approach can be beneficial when used in technical communication 
classrooms.  
 
Whereas  computer science professionals are often intimately involved with requirement 
elicitation and need clear communication with the client to succeed, technical 
communication professionals are often seen as ―outsiders‖ in those situations, useful only 
as recording secretaries and report writers. Their need is to develop skill at bridging 
between the content areas of the software engineers, the client, and their own specialized 
field, in essence becoming managers of the social processes of the workplace. This 
chapter explains the background which gave rise to both missions, and why our case 
studies effectively and uniquely address the concerns of both fields. 
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Project purpose: Computer Science 
Speaking of Software—NSF funded Project 
In a 2006 issue of Technical Communication Brady, Johnson and Wallace reported on the 
interdisciplinary project ―Speaking of Software: Integrating Communication and 
Documentation Techniques into an Undergraduate Software Engineering Curriculum.‖ 
Speaking of Software is an NSF-funded project intended to ―increase opportunities for all 
those participating to view communication as a rhetorical act and to integrate the theories 
and pedagogies of technical communication and software development‖ (318). Brady, 
Johnson and Wallace emphasize the possibilities that the Speaking of Software project 
provides for interdisciplinary collaboration, particularly for outlining what technical 
communication might ―give back‖ to other disciplines in ways that might increase the 
visibility of the field both in academia and industry. 
 
In order to reach this goal, project participants developed case studies to be used in 
software engineering courses to teach the rhetorical complexities of communicating with 
stakeholders—from the client to the end user—in the software development process. At 
the time that this first article was written, one case study had been developed but had not 
yet been employed in the classroom. Now, these case studies have been successfully used 
in the classroom and have yielded some unexpected insights. Subsequent sections of this 
report will share the qualitative methods used to develop the cases, and cover some of the 
results of that use.  
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The literature of software engineering presents the need for capturing recurrent 
difficulties in the process of software development. In other words, groups of individuals 
often create a massive and valuable knowledge base concerning the process of project 
design, developing effective means of dealing with the ambiguities of the situation as 
they go. Ethnography-based methods capture that knowledge from the lived experience 
of groups and individuals. Incorporating this knowledge and experience into pedagogical 
tools, the cases developed for the Speaking of Software Project have the potential to 
instill that experience in others. Students can achieve this simulated experience through 
their reflection on and imitation of the concrete examples of situations that can arise in 
any workplace. 
 
The initial goal was to develop case studies for Software Engineering classroom 
applications. This goal was complicated by the proprietary nature of the processes and 
products found in the workplace. This remains particularly true in software development, 
where the need for secrecy often outweighs pedagogical goals, and prevents students and 
faculty from sharing their workplace experiences.  Turning to the students themselves 
avoided this problem. While this may be considered a convenience sample in some 
respects, we believe it is a valuable and representative one. The Software Engineering 
program requires a Senior Design Project capstone course, where students work on real, 
practical software projects for outside clients and other stakeholders. An added benefit is 
that our method captures and presents the real experiences of fellow students, which 
students can then extrapolate to situations they are likely to find in entry-level positions. 
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Students appreciate these compelling stories about problematic communications that are 
familiar to them.  
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Project purpose: Technical Communication 
Why teach “making” and LEARN “acting”? (and how) 
For students who pursue degrees outside the liberal arts, the technical communication 
classroom is perhaps the best hope for acquiring the communication skills they will need 
in the workplace. These dedicated writing courses first appeared in engineering schools 
as a response to a perceived lack of writing ability on the part of their graduates. 
Basically prescriptive, they followed a ―forms‖ approach that taught the correct way to 
make memos, letters, and reports. Most educators and practitioners today would probably 
consider this approach to making documents a ―degenerate‖ techné, even if they might 
not use that precise terminology proposed by Wild (1941). A degenerate techné would 
imply that the person—the technical communicator, in this case—does not understand 
why she is making what she is making—merely that she must make it. Making (techné) 
in its proper application is a ―reasoned state of capacity to make‖ which does include 
knowing the ―why‖ of what is done (NE 1140a8). Atwill (1993; 1998; with Lauer 1995) 
has called for a production-based approach to teaching writing, seeking to revitalize 
techné. One common textbook that exemplifies this approach is Four Worlds of Writing  
(1991). In the various writing strategies presented, the importance of audience, context 
and purpose are explained in exhaustive detail, providing the student with the theoretical 
background (the ―why‖) of what is suggested. In advocating peer review and the 
subsequent revision of documents, the emphasis is on practicing the genre in use. Finally, 
copious checklists provide rules and procedures for grammar, spelling, and mechanical 
conventions.  
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In 1979 Carolyn Miller called for a more humanistic approach, one that included 
considerations of civic responsibility and social action—phronesis—as opposed to the 
more instrumental methods found in the textbooks of the day. Dunne (1993) also sought 
an approach based more on acting specifically to counter the behaviorist emphasis on 
making (and quantifiable results) he saw gaining strength in the school system. Phronesis 
as a ―reasoned state of capacity to act‖ has as its goal good action, in public, with others 
(NE 1140b5). Gained through experience (1142a14), it is a wisdom acquired through 
habituation (augmented, in a way we will explore, with ―training‖ through imitation). 
While Aristotle admits that in situations where practical purposes are concerned, 
experience is ―in no way inferior‖ to techné (Meta 981a14), it remains that ―men [or 
women] of mere experience‖ cannot directly teach their understanding (Meta 981b9) 
since each situation is unique, and not amenable to reduction to a set of rules or 
procedures.  
 
The importance of the distinction between making and acting is not limited to the 
theoretical realm or the academic classroom; it has implications and applications on the 
job as well. Brady (2007) has discussed the implications of our teaching, showing how 
what we teach and what students learn is taken to the workplace. Once on the job, the 
technical communicators she studied used their knowledge to make sense of ―existing 
information‖ and negotiate more effectively with the stakeholders. Brady‘s respondents 
recognized this negotiation as a social process: being in the workplace moved their 
knowledge from the mechanistic applications of ―making‖ they had initially used in the 
classroom to ―acting,‖ or working with others in the ―rough and tumble of public spaces‖ 
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(p. 59).  The noted professor of philosophy Hubert Dreyfus (2006) has accounted for this 
movement with a series of stages, relying on Heidegger‘s ―Being and Time‖. The student, 
or new employee, begins as a novice, moves through competence to expert status, and 
then on to mastery. Although Dreyfus‘ non-cognitivist approach to acquiring new skills 
raises certain difficulties, that discussion is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
 
Thomas Miller (1991) notes the deficiencies of inexperienced workers: although they 
possess the theory and the know-how, they lack the experience and common sense to put 
that knowledge into practice. This resembles the difference that Johnson-Eilola (2004) 
points to between a functional and a conceptual understanding of technology or genre. 
For example, those  entering a technical and professional communication course or a 
workplace as novices will frequently rely on prepackaged templates to create new (to 
them) genres such as resumes, memos, or business letters. In Johnson-Eilola‘s words, 
these templates are ―instructing users in functional but not conceptual aspects of 
technologies‖ (p. 179). Novice students with little to no experience in resume design, for 
example, plug in information as instructed by a word processing application‘s ―wizard,‖ 
often making resumes that ―look‖ right, but that pay little attention to their ultimate end: 
to get them hired. Created with only functional skill they prominently feature summer 
employment at fast-food chains in chronological work histories and leave out internships, 
course projects, and other valuable material that actually demonstrates that they are 
qualified for the job at hand. After receiving instruction about the conceptual—which in 
this context means rhetorical—aspects of resume design, they may begin to acquire 
competence, using their full ―reasoned capacity to make‖ to tailor the design and content 
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of their resume to particular employers. They will only master the resume when they 
have used it in real situations—at career fairs and during job interviews, for example. 
Once the (now not-so-new) student or employee has entered this stage, her response can 
encompass the total context, both task-related and social, becoming not just making a 
resume, but acting with it. She will have moved toward acquiring the practical wisdom 
that is necessary to engage with others about her resume (or any other task in the 
classroom or the workplace), modify it on the fly, and even know when to break 
completely with best practices. 
 
Dreyfus proposes an additional stage, where the individual who has mastered a skill 
couples that mastery with creativity to transform the world. While Dreyfus‘ examples—
Galileo, Martin Luther King, Jr., Larry Bird, and Henry Ford—are, by his own admission 
dramatic. Brady (2007), in her own ethnographic study of women writers in the 
workplace, provides examples that are more mundane. For instance, ―Frances‖ mentions 
involving the client in the process of creating documents, seeing them more as partners 
than as just recipients of the final product. ―Billie‖ concurs: ―You can‘t say ‗this is just 
the way it‘s going to be‘‖ to the client (p. 57). Compared with the past, when the mantra 
of the engineer was ―we can make whatever they throw over the wall,‖ a transformation 
is underway. User testing was perhaps the beginning. Working with others, rather than 
just for them, is becoming the valued action of the workplace. Technical communication 
practitioners like Frances and Billie have changed the world of documentation, 
developing and implementing new best practices that include, rather than ignore, the 
client and the user. 
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The workplace does not always welcome this kind of change, especially from new 
employees. From my experience in management, I can attest that often the status quo is 
in fact the best course of action. It is not always necessary to reinvent the wheel when the 
old wheel works just fine. While it would be counterproductive to continuously stifle the 
very knowledge and creativity sought from the new hire, mundane jobs sometimes call 
for mundane solutions.  Understanding and explaining tasks in terms of making and 
acting provides a resolution to this dilemma. Some tasks require one, some the other, and 
some both. It is experience that determines which is called for in any given situation. 
  
Why use case studies to educate? 
In the classroom, unfortunately, there is neither time nor availability for ―real world‖ 
making that can accommodate all students and prepare them for the world of work. 
Projects where the students work for a client are a start, but often are less than adequate 
as simulations of real experience: they are often seen as ―superficial‖ by the students and 
confounded by misdirection on the part of the ―clients‖ (Freedman, Adam and Smart 
1994; Blakeslee 1997, 2001). In internships or co-ops, students may find that three or 
four years of work in their major did not adequately prepare them for real-world tasks. 
They may become frustrated and disillusioned. The aim of a case study approach is to 
expose the students to the workplace situations, ethical dilemmas and political realities 
they may face by simulating that ―real world‖ experience.  
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Aristotle‘s Poetics suggests that well-crafted literature can be ―an imitation…of action 
and life‖ (1450a17-18). Good case studies that capture the essence of a situation do the 
same. Martha Nussbaum, in Fragility of Goodness (2001), has explicated this overlooked 
aspect of the Poetics, noting that Aristotle suggests that ―imitation is natural‖ and that it 
is through imitation that we learn (1448b; p. 5-9). When students reflect on and discuss 
the case, they bring their knowledge to discursive consciousness, reinforcing their 
learning. They will have begun to acquire the craft, the techné of what they make. That 
knowledge will become, as Brady found, a guide that will allow them to better cope with 
the various social contexts and practices of the workplace.  
 
Why our case studies? 
As noted above, Freedman, Adam and Smart (1994) report that students sometimes see 
case study simulations as ―artificial‖. Thomas (1995) suggests that some of that feeling 
may come from unrealistic expectations placed on the students by having them adopt the 
role of a bank president, for example. Instructors are asking them to play roles too far 
from their existing or imminent experience.  
 
In contrast, the cases in this dissertation present the experiences of students as they 
complete their Senior Design Projects, imitating the kind of ―entry level‖ positions they 
will find when they enter the workforce. This approach has the dual benefit of holding 
their interest while in school and later of easing their transition into the workplace. We 
have enlivened our case studies even more by responding to user reports of what works, 
and what does not. We have had some success: one reader of a case, for instance, said he 
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―couldn‘t put it down; it read like a novel.‖ Comments like these confirm that case 
studies can be improved by including some literary techniques, such as those suggested in 
the Poetics.  
 
Exploring the benefits of client-based projects, Spinuzzi and Blakeslee have both written 
on workplace collaborations. For Spinuzzi (1996) any workplace will do; the importance 
is to bring those experiences back to the classroom, share them with others, and reflect on 
them. Blakeslee (2001) finds that the kind of feedback the students receive on their 
performance is critical yet varies widely depending on the client or supervisor. Our cases 
simulate the ambiguity and goal-driven nature of the workplace. Their use in the 
classroom asks the students to make their analysis and interpretation of the situations 
presented explicit, fostering learning about how they might act were they actually in that 
situation.  In the next chapter I explain the concept of techné, and how it hav been used in 
technical communication pedagogy. 
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Chapter Two: Pedagogy 
Teaching Techné(ically) 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes that making (techné) is not doing, nor is 
doing making (1140a7). The purpose of this chapter is to review some of the conceptions 
of techné that have been suggested over the years, and explore how they might be 
deployed in the classroom. Some have argued for a Technical Communications pedagogy 
based on doing (C. Miller, T. Miller, D. Sullivan, and A. Blakeslee, to name a few); 
others have recommended one based on making, or, more usually,  a combination of the 
two (Atwill, Lauer, Johnson; and again, the list is far from complete). Given our 
postmodern sensibilities, rarely do we find advocates of teaching from a purely theoretic 
approach. I will argue that poiesis is the missing term (or, in the enthememic sense the 
tacit, understood term) that will allow me to answer the larger question ―Can we teach 
techné (ically)?‖ with a provisional yes.  
 
Historical Overview 
Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle each founded a school in ancient Greece, and each 
promulgated a slightly different understanding of techné. Early philosophers tended to 
include experience in techné, while later writers tended to disregard the value of practical 
experience in favor of more explicit teaching. For Plato, techné was a ―point of 
departure‖ for his more philosophic goals (Wild 1941, 255); for Isocrates techné was a 
discursive route to the production of character (Atwill 1998, 34); and for Aristotle it was 
more pragmatic, concerned with practical application: ―rather than arguing that students 
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of rhetoric must study philosophy and prepare to guide audiences to the true and the good 
as their primary mission, [Aristotle] believes that the study and practice of rhetoric itself 
is sufficient for meeting civic needs‖  (Gordon 2002, 153). 
 
Plato—The Making of Techné  
While most modern considerations of techné focus on Aristotle‘s work, in 1941 John 
Wild produced ―Plato‘s Theory of Techné: A Phenomenological Interpretation‖. In a 
move close to any technites heart, Wild notes that the Platonic usage of techné includes 
inseparably both ―art‖ and ―craft‖ of modern usage, where art pertains to the production 
of beautiful things, and craft reserved for the production of useful things. Thus the 
ancient definition is one that applies to the bricklayer as it does the musician (255). Wild 
begins his definition of techné as ―any act that can give a rational account of itself, 
explaining why it does what it is doing‖, which Wild credits to Gorgias (256). This 
‗ability to explain itself‘ is a critical element in both the processes of teaching and 
learning, an often missing element in the arguments of those who favor a more 
experiential approach.   
 
Wild forms his interpretation based on a careful analysis of a wide range of Plato‘s work; 
here I have retained the titles (but not the line numbers) to honor Wild‘s scholarship, and 
make evident (with Wild) that Plato‘s discussion of techné must be teased out from a 
variety of texts, as opposed to those discussions found relatively intact as in Aristotle.  
According to Wild, Plato‘s concept of techné requires the knowledge of a ―standard or 
form‖ (Statesman), and how to achieve the desired end through action (Phadreus), 
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physical matter to be acted upon (Cratylus) (257), and the work (ergon), the ―completed 
action, the material arranged in its proper form‖ (258). But this ―work‖ is not necessarily 
limited to a physical product; such as the ever-popular rudder often put forth as one 
example of techné. There is also a further end, the ―for the sake of something‖ (Gorgias) 
(259); the end outside the work or product itself, or telos. The corresponding example of 
telos is steering the ship with the ergon, the aforementioned rudder. The activity that goes 
on during this ‗bringing things into existence‘ is, without Wild explicitly acknowledging 
it, poiesis.  
 
Wild contends in ―perfected‖ techné, all five factors are known in advance, there is also a 
flow, a sequence to them: the ‗for the sake of‘ leads, followed by the ergon, then the 
form, then the procedure, and finally the material. When we have only procedure and 
material, we have ―mere technique‖ (259) or, as it is called in this work, an 
―impoverished techné‖. This less than perfect condition has often been applied to the 
work that happens on an assembly line, while perfect techné is reserved for craftsmen and 
artisans.  
 
More important to an eventual discussion of teaching is Wild‘s observation that the 
practice of techné inverts the order and moves from the material (‗what needs fixing‘ in 
his example) to the ―for the sake of‖. Practice here can be read two ways. In Wild‘s 
example it refers first to the practice of a craft, as we say ‗practicing medicine‘. The 
doctor is not presented with the ‗for the sake of‘, which is health, but with the injury to be 
fixed. This still remains techné, provided that the practitioner is guided by knowledge in 
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the proper order (260). The way to that guiding knowledge (the second interpretation of 
practice) is through exposure and repetition—the ‗getting your hands dirty‘ part—which 
Wild refers to as ―practice or direct experience‖ (empeiria) (261). Wild claims that if the 
person learns mainly the form or structure (eidos) he will follow the path of the theorist. 
Conversely, if he learns primarily technique he becomes a technician, while the true 
master attains both (260).  
 
According to Wild, Plato divides science (episteme—reliable insight which is not subject 
to change) into two classes: the knowing arts (insight alone for its own sake) and the 
directing arts (arts and crafts which involve technical action, but also possess scientific 
insight). This is the theory/practice binary often debated in rhetoric and technical 
communication circles (cf. Atwill; Atwill and Lauer; C. Miller). He further divides the 
practice side of the binary into one part that brings into our possession that which already 
existed (269), and one part that brings something into existence, a division he presented 
in the Sophist.  
 
While it is the division involved with ―bringing things into existence‖ that usually 
receives the most attention, Wild also provides informative comments on education. 
While the producing arts may degrade into mere technique, education may degrade into 
control (the ‗useful or practical‘ argument that Callicles offers in Gorgias), 
―indoctrinating the student with customs, theories, and habits‖ (277). Prior to this 
degradation exists the potential for a more effective manner of teaching ―regulative‖. 
While ―lengthy and arduous‖, this method ―helps the child to help himself‖ by ―enabling 
36 
 
him [sic] to distrust his own opinions, and discover the [reason for things] himself‖ (276). 
As Sullivan, Rutter, and others have advised, we must be cautious to avoid this 
degradation, and aware of what ideologies we might be unconsciously indoctrinating into 
our students.  
 
Protagoras and Isocrates—the Doing of Techné 
Linking Plato to Isocrates via the dialogue Protagoras, Atwill (1998) uses the words of 
Socrates‘ foil to explain logōn techné tradition as: ―The proper care of his personal 
affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also of the state‘s affairs so 
as to become a real power in the city, both as a speaker and a man of action [318e-19]‖ 
(150). In contrast to Plato‘s concern with eternal truth and individual achievement of the 
contemplative life, Protagoras‘s logon techné is ―inextricably tied‖ to civic involvement. 
―It is an art in which all citizens must have a share‖, one which sees virtue not as 
something solely within the individual but as something coextensive with social life; and 
has more to do with the construction of an ethos than with precepts and prescription 
(154). While usually all forms of civic action are more commonly reserved for phronesis 
than techné, that Protagoras (and as we will see later Isocrates) would include it in techné 
supports Wild‘s contention that the term, for the ancients, carried a richness of meaning 
not clearly understood today.  
 
Atwill claims that ―unlike Plato, Protagoras insists that virtue can be taught‖ (19) but 
Isocrates, more in line with Plato, does not (20). Both reject Plato‘s notion of a ―single 
model of virtue‖ for a more contingent one that allows for an interpretation of ‗virtue‘ 
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that is not static and eternal. For Isocrates, the character he promises to teach is measured 
―by the esteem one earns from one‘s peers‖ (28). 
 
This emphasis on a sense of virtue based on situational conditions in the social sphere is 
reflected in Sipiora‘s (1995) claim that the Isocratean paideia was based on doxa, ethics, 
phronesis, and imatatio (12) since ―doxa, not Platonic episteme, produces the kind of 
conviction that moves the person to action‖ (18). For all Atwill‘s desire to place 
Isocrates‘ ―logōn techné tradition‖ within techné proper, Isocrates‘ emphasis on doxa 
(opinion or ideologies) of the audience as opposed to the craft itself, and his claim to 
make his students good citizen/orators (18) seems to place him more in a mode of 
phronesis than techné. However, as Sipiora argues, while Isocratean teaching is focused 
on discovering the ―pragmatic and expedient‖, it does not rule out the power of the art of 
rhetoric as an adjunct to phronesis (17). Although a modern understanding might make it 
hard to agree with Atwill‘s placement of Isocrates‘ pedagogy as techné-inspired, it is 
certainly one approach to an integration of techné and phronesis.  
 
Aristotle—The Ends of Action 
That Atwill (1993) could be unaware of this difficulty seems unlikely; more probable is 
that she is trying to find a ‗bridge‘ that could resolve the ‗theory-practice‘ binary she 
explored in ―Instituting the Art of Rhetoric: Theory, Practice, and Productive Knowledge 
in Interpretations of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric‖. 
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Reminding us that Aristotle sets out three ―orders of knowledge‖—the theoretical 
(involving philosophy, math, and natural sciences, the practical (ethics and politics) and 
the productive (which ―subsumes all technai, or arts, from medicine and architecture to 
poetics and rhetoric‖ (93)). Although she claims that, per Aristotle, they shared ―three 
critical characteristics: their epistemological and axiological indeterminacy, their 
implication in an ‗interested‘ act of social exchange, and their contingency on time and 
circumstance‖ (93), it is unclear what she offers to support this claim. While from my 
reading of Aristotle those traits could certainly be ascribed to phronesis, and in some 
ways to techné,  I do not recall seeing theoria linked to ―indeterminacy‖ and 
―contingency‖ in any substantive way.  
 
Leaving theory aside for the moment, Atwill‘s claim that ―The relationship Aristotle 
creates between praxis as action and practical knowledge [phronesis] … is not an easy 
one to decipher….The telos of practical knowledge is clearly eudaimonia,…but is it an 
action (praxis) or is it a state (hexis)?‖ (98) needs some attention. One way to decipher 
the relationship was provided by Michael Bowler (2006): In ancient times, praxis 
referred to an activity whose telos is the activity itself (personal communication). We can 
take a walk; not for the exercise or health, but just for the activity. Taking a walk may 
help us be healthy, but that may be neither our intention nor our end. Not every praxis 
must be reduced to a means-end outcome (though many can be, and are). Nor must every 
praxis be directed toward good, some obviously are not.  
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This difference between the state (hexis) and the action (praxis) is an important one, and 
perhaps that difference is more clearly made in the original Greek:  
 
ε ε  δ' η  οι  κοδομικ  η σνη η ρ ε  ζηι κ   ο   επ ε   ξιρ ηιρ μεη  λ  ος  οιηηικ , κ   ος  δεμ   
ος   ηε η σνη ε  ζη ν η  ηιρ ος  μεη  λ  ος  οιηηικ  ε   ξιρ ε  ζη ν, ος   ηε ηοι  ηη η  ος η σνη, η ς  η ν 
   ν ει   η η σνη κ   ε   ξιρ μεη  λ  ος   ληθος  ρ  οιηηικ . (NE 1140a7-9) 
 
(―Now since architecture is an art and is essentially a reasoned state of the capacity to 
make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any state that is not an art, art 
is identical with a state of a capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning‖. 
(Ross translation) 
 
Here Aristotle is direct. Architecture (οι  κοδομικ ) is an art (η σνη), which is a reasoned 
state (μεη  λ  ος ε   ξιρ); the action ( οιηηικ , making) is only one possible action that can 
be ―aligned‖ (to use Dunne‘s term) with a ―reasoned state‖. Similarly, in Aristotle‘s 
delineation between acting and making: 
  
ω   ζηε κ   η μεη  λ  ος ε   ξιρ  π κηικ  ε   ηεπ ν ε ζηι ηη ρ μεη  λ  ος  οιηηικη  ρ ε   ξεωρ  
 
the μεη  λ  ος ε  ξιρ [reasoned state] of  π κηικ  [acting or practice] is different from the 
μεη  λ  ος ε   ξιρ [reasoned state]of  οιηηικη  ρ poiesis or making]. (NE 1140a4-6) 
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More worrisome than their opinion on the teachability of phronesis, however, is Atwill 
and Lauer‘s (1995) take on Aristotle‘s definition of techné. In ―Refiguring Rhetoric as an 
Art: Aristotle‘s Concept of Techné‖, they interpret Aristotle‘s techné to be: ―Only 
productive knowledge has no ends in itself: its origin, or first principle (arche) is in the 
artist and its telos is in the user (NE 1140a5-15). The end of an art is not a product, but 
the use made of the artistic construct‖ (29). To bolster this interpretation they rely on the 
Rhetoric, where Aristotle reports that it is the hearer that ―determines the speech‘s end 
and object‖ (1358b). While this is consistent with many other places where Aristotle 
expresses similar sentiments (on rudders and housebuilding, for example), this view 
leaves out the importance of poiesis. In the Ross translation of their quote I find no 
reference to the telos of techné whatsoever. In 1140b Aristotle states that ―for while 
making has an end other than itself‖, that does not imply that there is only an end other 
than itself, just that there is an end other than itself in the activity of techné (poiesis), 
which for the activity of phronesis (praxis) there is not. For phronesis, to resurrect an old 
adage, doing good in public is its own reward. 
 
If we look back to Plato‘s Republic we can find a similar sentiment: ―Excellence or 
beauty of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to 
the use for which nature or the artist has intended it‖ (X, 601). But Plato, through 
Socrates, outlines a much more symbiotic relation between maker and user, where the 
user indicates the good and bad of the thing made to the maker, telling the maker how the 
thing should be made, and the maker will ―attend to his instructions‖, noting that the 
maker has only a correct belief, which is gained from talking to, and listening to, the 
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user‖ (X, 602). This striving for the good, in concert with others, suggests a certain 
phronetic component to techné. 
 
Also often cited in support of her contention (as Atwill does in Reclaimed) is this passage 
from the Politics: 
 
‗There are some arts whose products are not judged solely, or best, by the artist 
themselves, namely those arts whose products are recognized even by those who do not 
possess the art; for example, the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder 
only; the user…the master of the house will be even a better judge than the builder…‘ 
(Pol. 1282a18-24) 
 
Yet even here there is no indication that Aristotle intends that the user is the only judge of 
the product; just a ‗better‘ judge within the confines of his use of it.  His point seems to 
be that the maker is not the sole judge either: once the product escapes the maker there 
are others who will judge it, and it would be the wise maker who takes this into account.  
 
In the Physics, just before describing the ―four causes‖, Aristotle supports this more 
complex interpretation when he tells us that:  
―The arts that govern the matter and have knowledge are two, namely the art which 
uses the product and the art that directs the production of it. That is why the using 
art is also in a sense directive; but it differs in that it knows the form, whereas the 
art…concerned with production knows the matter. For the helmsman knows and 
prescribes what form the helm should have, and the other from what wood it should 
be made and by means of what operations‖ (194b1-7).  
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There are, then, two dispositions of techné that are often conflated. One is the techné of 
production, and one the techné of use. Both involve an activity (poiesis). The difference 
is that ―while all things are ‗for the sake of‘ the end, though they differ from one another 
in that some are activities, others are instruments‖ (195a). To bring this to a modern 
example, if the end is health through reduced cholesterol, exercise is an activity that can 
bring that end about. The cholesterol-reducing drug Crestor is an instrument that can also 
bring about that end. 
 
Dunne (1993) falls prey to a conflation of his own, but in the area of phronesis. In Back 
to the Rough Ground he begins well by defining that Aristotelian praxis is ―conduct in a 
public space with others…without ulterior purpose and with a view to no object 
detachable from himself…‖ but finishes his sentence with ―[a person] acts in such a way 
as to realize excellences that he has come to appreciate in his community as constitutive 
of a worthwhile way of life‖ (10). With this interpretation he implicitly links praxis to 
phronesis (as do so many) and elides the possibility that praxis can stand alone. The 
difficulty inherent in this view is that by restricting virtuous action only as an action of 
phronesis, there is left no space for virtuous action in the action of techné, poiesis. 
 
Impoverished Techné 
In ―Refiguring Rhetoric‖, Atwill and co-author Janice Lauer (1995) examine the manner 
in which techné has been ―suppressed‖ by a theory/practice binary (25). They position the 
two poles of this binary as the theoretical (rhetoric as end in itself; an ―inquiry into the 
nature of communication‖) and the practical. Practical rhetoric, seen as a ―means to an 
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end‖ has two variants: the handbook tradition (26); and the ―statesman/orator tradition 
(drawn from Kennedy‘s work in his Classical Rhetoric and its Christian & Secular 
Tradition) which includes both epistemological and practical considerations (27). While 
applauding their intention of rescuing techné from suppression in the binary, I find two 
things troubling. The first is their somewhat cavalier use of the term ―practical‖.  At times 
it connotes something pragmatic, even techné related, as in ―practical rhetorics 
contend…that rhetoric is valuable for its application in practical situations‖ (26). At other 
times their usage is more in keeping with Aristotle‘s practical knowledge (phronesis), as 
when they discuss the actions usually falling within the statesman/orator tradition, where 
―rhetoric is instrumental to the welfare of the individual and the state, a condition 
described by Aristotle‘s interpretation of eudemonia‖ (27).   
  
 
Hannah Arendt (1958), in The Human Condition, provides an interesting take on techné 
and phronesis in her tripartite division of the vita active into labor, work, and action.  She 
positions labor as those biological necessities of life; work as production; and action as 
―the only activity that goes on between men without the intermediary of things or matter‖ 
(7).  
 
For her, in ancient Greece ―to ‗labor‘ meant to be enslaved by necessity‖, and was 
inherent in the human condition. It was acquiring food and shelter, and other ‗necessities‘ 
required to sustain life (84). ‗Work‘ for Arendt, ―fabricates the unending variety of things 
whose sum total constitutes the human artifice. They are mostly, but not exclusively, 
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objects of use and they possess durability‖ (136). As an object of use that is durable, the 
thing produced, the product itself would be ergon. As for Plato and Aristotle, part of what 
guides fabrication is outside the fabricator (140)—a model (eidos) in the sense of the 
formal cause of what is made (142).  
 
Putting a Heideggerian read on Wild‘s consideration of there being two ends in techné, 
Arendt writes that ―During the work process, everything is judged in terms of suitability 
and usefulness for the desired end, and nothing else. The same standards of means and 
ends apply to the product [ergon] itself. Though it is an end with respect to the means by 
which it was produced, and is the end of the fabrication process, it never becomes, so to 
speak, and end in itself, at least not as long as is remains an object for use‖ (153). She 
refers to this a as a chain, where ―every end can serve again as a means in some other 
context‖ (154). As in Heidegger, one end is in ‗use‘ (ready-to-hand), and another, 
perhaps ‗impoverished‘ state, is ‗just there‘ (present-at-hand). Importantly, we shouldn‘t 
think of the ‗end‘ as static, reduced to either an end-in-itself or an end-outside-itself; 
―end‖ can be both depending on context: in-itself for fabricator, from the point of view of 
the fabricator outside-itself for user, internal again (for the user) in that use. 
  
Action, for Arendt, discloses the agent, just as making discloses the product and labor the 
need. Men appear as men [as opposed to objects] through speech and action (176). Yet 
she sees it as the retrospective revealing of ―the historian, who indeed always knows 
better what it was all about than the participants‖ (192). In Arendt we find another 
devaluation of the maker: the maker is not the best judge of the thing made. We saw a 
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similar move in Atwill, and Atwill and Lauer. For them it was the user of the product. 
Arendt takes it one step further. For her, neither the maker nor the user is the best judge, 
she reserves that honor for the historian. 
 
If it is the historian who reveals (and inscribes) action for Arendt, then for de Certeau  
(1984) it is the engineer who is proximally responsible. Tracing the loss of personal 
action on the part of the artisan to before the industrial revolution, in The Practice of 
Everyday Life he notes that Fontenelle in 1699 described a ―linguistic inversion‖ wherein 
the ―improper‖ language of the practitioners is introduced by ethnographers ―into the 
field of scientific written language‖ (67).  In the middle 1700s this ―third man‖ who 
―mediates between the ‗man of the theorem‘ and the ‗man of experience‘ would be the 
engineer‖ (69). Detaching ‗know-how‘ from human performance, the engineer installed it 
into machines; he replaced manual competence with ―regulatable combinations of forms, 
materials, and forces‖ (69). What remains to the practitioner has ―no legitimacy with 
respect to productive rationality‖ (69). This lore is transmuted into stories, narratives that 
guide everyday practices (70). But for de Certeau, ―this knowledge is not known‖ (71, 
italics in original) to the subject. If it is not known nor reflected upon it cannot ―explain 
itself‖ under the terms Wild proposes; then it is not perfected techné, but some 
impoverished form of it.  
 
Teaching Techné(ically)—Application 
So how can we teach techné (ically)? Dubinsky (2002), in ―More than a Knack: Techné 
& Teaching Technical Communication‖ calls for training teachers to be technites, as this 
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will make them reflective practitioners who ―understand the critical need for situational 
uses of knowledge‖ (120). He allows that while some argue that more experience 
(repetition) will ―lead to effective teaching‖ (130), Dubinsky disagrees: they become 
‗men of experience‘, but not reflective, a skill they will need to ―enable them to make 
both practical and ethical judgments‖ (130). He claims that while many scholars want 
more classical rhetoric, they eschew techné because of its prescriptive (handbook) nature; 
they see it as ‗impoverished techné‘, which echoes Wild‘s argument on the ‗inversion‘ of 
techné.  ―The issue‖, claims Dubinsky, ―is between knack and art‖ (132).  
 
While he calls on Dunne‘s argument that the ―knowledge about an activity, which is 
explained by the technites, requires someone observing the actual making (the poiesis), 
paying close attention to the way the technites works (322)‖, he seems less than generous 
to the poor technite who ―only‖ works with wood; diminishing his techné in favor of that 
of the physician (135). 
 
Although he wishes to ―revitalize techné, tempered with phronesis‖, the remainder of his 
comments belie his emphasis on techné.  His agreement with C. Miller (1989) that 
technical communication pedagogy should be a ‗matter of conduct rather than 
production…a matter of arguing in a prudent way toward the good of the community 
rather than of constructing texts‘ (23) seems to place him firmly with those who wish to 
take a phronetic approach.  That said, his suggestion that we ―take what Aristotle called a 
‗reasoned state of capacity to make‘ and show it is both a knowledge and a ‗capacity for 
action‘ that can benefit students and society‖ (143) is promising.   
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Like Atwill, Lauer, and Dubinsky, Carl Mitcham (1994), in Thinking through 
Technology, seeks to revitalize techné (with a hard tie to scientific knowledge) through a 
philosophical episteme. Mitcham reviews in great detail the history of technology as seen 
through the writings of many of the outstanding theorists of the twentieth century.  
Possibly due to his extensive philosophical background, he seems at times to go too far in 
the direction of theory; almost losing the experiential as he tries to stand back from the 
―demands of practice‖ (7) in his attempt to ―create more space, more open ground‖ for 
ethical reflection.  
 
We can view Mitcham‘s definition of technology (the making and using of artifacts) as 
an analogue of techné. But he, like others, can be very unflattering to those of us who 
claim techné: ―it is a largely unthinking activity. It emerges from unattended-to ideas and 
motives, while it engages with unreflected-upon objects‖ (1), which is closer to an 
impoverished than a true techné.  Although he is trying to inform us on the humanities‘ 
philosophy of technology, he stays, for the most part, closely within the instrumental and 
epistemological. In his discussion of ―technology as activity‖, the activity is not the 
action of phronesis, but techné: ―the craftsman gives natural materials forms which 
would not naturally arise in them‖ (211). Even when discussing the politics of 
technology—while admitting the politics is Aristotle‘s master art and therefore decidedly 
phronetic—Mitcham can‘t avoid the rational, rule-governed and logical.  
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We can ask: Does experience ever come to inform Mitcham‘s thought? There are a few 
places where Mitcham acknowledges experience. One is in his discussion of techné, 
where he translates ―phronesis‖ into the later, Latin, prudentia, and claims that ―the 
definition exactly parallels the one given earlier for techné‖ (124). The citation he 
provides is Aristotle‘s statement about both having a ―reasoned capacity to...‖, from there 
they diverge wildly. Obviously this is a grammatical parallel only, the content of the two 
phrases set up a well-established polarity. Mitcham then reduces political concerns to 
―nomos‖, or law, and equates judges to the equivalent of artisans.  Mitcham also 
considers experience in his epilogue, in the Heideggerian sense of ―being-with‖, which is 
―disclosed through technical engagements and is therefore primarily social...[this] world 
is composed not solely of tools and artifacts, but of tools used with others and belonging 
to others‖ (276).  
 
Dunne seems to be on the same page as Mitcham with his view that the modern world 
attempts to see rationality as coextensive with technique (227). Instead of just exploring 
why that is so, he tries to correct the situation by showing that theory and experience, far 
from being separate domains (like he sees techné and phronesis) can be found within 
techné (229). He shows how in the Metaphysics Aristotle himself suggested a connection, 
and how theory, ―for all its primacy, does not displace phronesis as the ordering agent in 
our lives‖ (241).   
 
But we need to be careful with Dunne and his use of that word ―the‖, which suggests a 
single ordering agent. Remember, his goal is to argue against ―behavioral objectives‖ 
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schooling. For all his quotes of Aristotle that link techné with experience, such as: 
―Techné arises when, from many notions gained by experience, one universal judgment 
arises‖ (Meta1.1.981a; 5-12), there always seems to be the link to theory and the 
invariable; here, a ―universal judgment‖. However, he is correct when he says of the 
Metaphysics that ―what seems to be missing is some conception of how techné qua 
techné can be complimented by experience‖ (282), and that Aristotle lets experience slip 
by in favor of the explanatory power of techné, and of theory in general. The same might 
be said of Dunne, as he tries to explain Aristotle‘s theorizing. Again, this is in line with 
the difficulties McCarthy and Wright see in the design of technology: too much emphasis 
on the instrumental—on the efficiency of design—and not enough attention paid to the 
human interaction. 
 
In the epilogue, Dunne lets it all slip in favor of Phronesis, forgetting even his own 
carefully crafted definitions. How else can we explain the statement ― [from his 
argument] an important role should be given to practicing teachers who are not only 
phronomoi but are also well equipped to teach apprentice-teachers to become 
phronomoi‖ (370). Phronesis as teachable? Not according to Aristotle. He follows with 
more examples drawn from techné, even calling on a context-bound logos of good 
practice he outlined earlier. It seems like, in closing, he became aware again of his 
purpose, to argue against instrumentalism of the ―behavioral objectives‖ model that he 
neglected his own work. He seems to have discounted the importance of techné and 
theory to make his case.  
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So how can we avoid problems like too instrumental an approach that conveys only 
theory from some handbook or the unbounded relativisim (and ultimate unteachability) of 
a phronetic approach, or some combination that collapses one into the other? Elsewhere I 
have explored the possibility of a techné of phronesis, that is, a reasoned capacity to 
make, with that making informed by a reasoned capacity to act. In other words, we must 
strive to educate technites in a way that completes Aristotle‘s somewhat contradictory 
descriptions that first say: 
 
―If, then, a man has the theory without the experience...he will often fail‖ 
(Meta.A1: 981; 20-24)  
 
Yet a few lines later says that: 
―We think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to 
experience, and we suppose the  artist to be wiser than men of experience … 
because the former know the cause, and the latter do not... thus we view them as 
being wiser not in the virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory for 
themselves and knowing the causes. And in general it is a sign of the man who 
knows and of the man who does not know, that the former can teach, and therefore 
we think art more truly knowledge than experience is; for artists can teach, and men 
of mere experience cannot.‖ (Meta.A1: 981a25-981b10) 
 
Poiesis—The Action of Techné 
Poiesis, for Aristotle, is production, making: it is the action of techné. In his example, 
architecture (οι  κοδομικ ) is an art (η σνη), which is a reasoned state (μεη  λ  ος ε   ξιρ); 
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poiesis ( οιηηικ , making) is only one possible action that can be associated with that 
―reasoned state‖ (NE 1140a7-9). Further, as Heidegger (1953) explores Aristotle‘s four 
causes, we can see the resonance with poiesis. The four causes are the material (matter); 
the formal (idea); the final (the end); and the efficient (what ‗brings about‘, the action of 
the producer). And when these four causes ―play in unison‖ (10) production as poiesis is 
revealed for what it is; a coming together of different factors that shows us something we 
had not seen before. For Wild, ―perfected‖ techné accomplishes poiesis. There is also a 
flow, a sequence to the causes: when we have only procedure and material, we have 
―mere technique‖ (259) or, as some have called it, an ‗impoverished techné‘. This less 
than perfect condition has often been applied to the work that happens on an assembly 
line, while perfect techné and its action poiesis are reserved for craftsmen and artisans.  
 
Atwill (1993) then shifts her focus to techné and the bifurcations commonly ascribed to 
Aristotle: ―If practical knowledge is identified in some way with ‗acting‘, then productive 
knowledge is concerned with ‗making‘. It is a poiesis distinguished by instrumentality as 
well as epistemological and ethical indeterminacy‖ (99). If the ―it‖ in the second sentence 
refers to ―productive knowledge‖, there is a problem similar to the one that plagues the 
praxis-phronesis relationship. Techné is not poiesis; it is, as Dunne interprets Book VI of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, ―aligned‖ with it: ―Aristotle there aligns techné with a kind of 
activity he calls ‗making‘ or ‗production‘ (poiēsis)‖ (9). Notable in his interpretation is 
that he sees poiesis as a kind of activity (praxis). This supports the contention that poiesis 
is in fact a praxis, albeit perhaps different from the praxis associated with phronesis. By 
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removing the idea that praxis is only linked to phronesis, it becomes possible to speak of 
a praxis of techné, which is poiesis.  
 
Teaching Poietically   
I believe it is in poiesis, the activity of making, that theory and practice come together. I 
have developed, and used, a tentative pedagogy for teaching technical communications 
that focuses on poiesis, rather than theoria, phronesis, or some static interpretation of 
techné. Incorporation of Martin Heidegger‘s read of poiesis as laid out in The Question 
Concerning Technology allows for the inclusion of the action and ethical implications 
that are involved with any act of production in a way that other methods do not. 
 
Heidegger gives us the ―ancient‖ definition of a thing (in his example technology, which 
I will reinterpret as ‗production‘) as ―what the thing is‖ (4). When dealing with the 
question of what production is, he relates that the common two answers given are 1) a 
means to an end, and 2) a human activity, two of the very attributes that, in the case of the 
former ‗impoverish‘, and in the latter unduly complicate our pedagogical goals. 
Heidegger calls this the ―instrumental and anthropological definition‖ (5).  If we further 
explore this definition in light of the four causes that Heidegger explains through 
Aristotle, we can see the importance of poiesis, where means and activity are combined. 
The four causes are the material (matter); the formal (idea); the final (the end, but not 
specified as ergon or telos); and the efficient (what ‗brings about‘, the action of the 
producer).  
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When these four causes ―play in unison‖ (10) production is revealed for what it is; a 
coming together of different factors that shows us something we had not seen before. 
Another useful interpretation of this playing in unison (one that could easily be brought 
into a classroom) is to picture it as that poetic ―aha‖ moment of creativity or inspiration 
that most everyone has experienced at one time or another. To qualify as this, the 
production must be within the four causes, the third of which (the end) can be interpreted 
as use in a context. 
 
Heidegger claims we sometimes forestall immediate use in favor of storage (14). Storage 
is not an end use, but directed toward another use (15). Setting something aside for the 
future accomplishing of something else, unlike the poetic revealing described above, is a 
never-ending process, much like Arendt‘s chain.  Heidegger‘s term for this is standing-
reserve. A difficulty arises when thinking of standing-reserve: things are standing-reserve 
for whom? Unlike Atwill, Lauer and Dubinsky who seem to marginalize the technite, 
Heidegger seems to marginalize the user of technology in favor of the production 
process. Heidegger‘s example of the airplane on the tarmac as standing-reserve tends to 
break down when we ask the question: standing-reserve for whom? To the future flier, it 
is standing reserve without a doubt. But that is where Heidegger stops. We can imagine 
several other situations, or users, to whom that self-same airplane, at that same time, is 
not standing-reserve. To the bank that carries the loan on it, it is collateral. And to the 
rabbit huddled underneath it, the effect of the combination of the four causes results in an 
immediate effect: shade. Neither of the last two, I would argue, is standing-reserve, they 
both have a specific and useful end at the moment of examination.  
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Application and Discussion 
The use of standing reserve can be used in an enlightening way in a technical 
communication classroom. Although a difficult read for undergraduates unfamiliar with 
Heidegger (and philosophy in general), I have successfully used The Question 
Concerning Technology in classrooms for years. Providing a handout of the section 
relevant to standing reserve (14-18) keeps the reading accessible, and Heidegger‘s 
examples (windmills, hydroelectric plants, airplanes, etc.) are compelling. Often the 
students take to material on their own, and class discussion can clarify the finer points. 
 
 When applied to the production of a resume and a cover letter, both can be seen as prime 
examples of standing reserve, especially in the context of the assignment. The students 
are producing something now to be used later. The skills they acquire and the documents 
themselves can both be seen as being stored for future use. Making these functions 
explicit to the students as standing-reserve has, I believe, not only allowed them to see 
documentation in a new light, but removed some of the resistance they express to 
producing work that they see no immediate use for. The students respond to this well, and 
in general agree with Heidegger. Storage—standing reserve—is not in and of itself a 
problem, as long as there will be some future use. Damming a river, building a 
hydroelectric plant, eventually provides electricity. Saving money for future use is a good 
idea. But a one student put it, the miser dying on his sacks of gold has no purpose. And 
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for the students, having to learn things they see no future use for is equally pointless. And 
that is Heidegger‘s argument: separating making from use is the real danger. 
 
I believe these small moves in the classroom will enable a discussion of any document—
or technology—in multiple ways as suggested by my interpretation of Heidegger: 
1. As something produced now, in a poiētic moment 
2. As something being used, but later, again in a poiētic moment 
3. As something produced now but stored to be used later, a stage where it is 
standing-reserve 
In bringing out this third option, this third way of seeing any production, we can open the 
door for thinking about what it means ―to produce‖ something poiēticly and not. This 
allows discussion of Aristotle‘s—via Heidegger—discussion of the four causes; and 
about the ―appropriateness‖ (ethics) of ―that which brings about.‖  As currently taught, 
one of the goals of a technical communication course is to ―complicate‖ how the students 
see documents.  
 
One of the difficulties in teaching Technical Communication at an institution that focuses 
on training engineers is that many of these budding engineers, from civil, mechanical, 
electrical, or other fields, are deeply invested in the instrumental perspective. As C. 
Miller (1979) wrote ―scientists, engineers, teachers of technical writing and their students 
tacitly share the positivist theory about the role of rhetoric in science. Consequently, 
students look upon writing as a superfluous, bothersome, and usually irrelevant aspect of 
their technical work‖ (615). Yet from my experience in teaching writing courses 
56 
 
(composition and technical communication), philosophy, and rhetoric over the past ten 
years, Heidegger‘s emphasis on the inclusion of human activity in the production of and 
ultimately reflection on technology resonates with these future engineers. This reflection 
on the human aspects of activity, and ultimately societal consequences, can be seen as the 
progenitor of the acquisition of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis, and will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter.  
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Teaching Phronetic(ally)  
Whereas techné concerns production—the making of some thing or bringing about some 
state of affairs—and can be taught through rules and procedures as well as practice, 
phronesis cannot be taught in such a direct fashion. Phronesis is too kairotic, too 
situation-dependent to be broken down into a transmissible set of hard and fast rules. 
 
Phronesis 
Phronesis has been contrasted quite well with techné in previous sections. To refresh, and 
highlight the differences, phronesis is the reasoned capacity to act. Specifically, it is 
doing good not only in public, but for the public, as well as for one‘s own good. 
Phronesis relies on aisthesis (intellectual perception) (NE1142a/27). Where practical 
purposes (prattein, usually translated as action) are concerned experience (emperia) is ―in 
no way inferior‖ to techné (Meta 981a14), it remains that ―men of mere experience‖ 
cannot teach their understanding (Meta 981b9), because they have no knowledge of the 
‗why something works‘ in contrast to why something does not, nor do they have 
universal tenets to pass along. Becoming phronetic, a phronemoi, is therefore generally 
considered to require experience. Teaching phronetically can then be understood as 
facilitating student learning through experience. However, when providing real-world 
experience is impractical, educators often attempt to achieve the same goal through 
simulating experience. 
 
The purpose of this section is to review the concept of experience which, for Aristotle 
and others, is the central requirement to become a phronemoi. 
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Introduction to Experience 
Interest in ―experience‖ has surged in recent years. In the popular press, a recent AARP 
Bulletin features ―Heirs of War,‖ an article by Suzanne Freeman (2005) recounting the 
efforts of the children of World War II veterans to ―uncover their parents‘ lost stories‖ 
(21). An effort to record the life experience of early aviators before they are gone is 
underway at the Experimental Aviation Association.  The National Geographic Society 
sponsors a similar program as well, providing guidelines on how to preserve the personal 
narratives of our elders. For the last two, the effort is predominately an altruistic attempt 
to record history in the words of those who lived it. What caught my eye about Freeman‘s 
article was the attitude of the people who undertake this search. The children of the 
veterans wish to come to ―understand their parents‘ wartime experiences,‖ to ―walk in the 
places where their parents‘ walked‖ (21). They wanted to simulate their parents' 
experience: feel it, not just record it. 
 
John McCarthy and Peter Wright (2005) attempt to explicate the need for experience in 
software engineering, and fill that need through the use of case studies. In Technology as 
Experience, they argue that those who design, use and evaluate interactive systems need 
to be able to understand and evaluate people‘s felt experience with technology.  
 
Freeman, as well as McCarthy and Wright, all struggle with this separation between real 
and simulated (or recorded) experience. For Freeman‘s interviewees, it is the relationship 
between knowledge and experience. In her examples, we can see the veterans‘ children 
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recognize their lack of experience, and watch as they try to uncover some of it by 
simulating the events in their parents‘ lives. They take their trips to historic battlefields to 
try to gain the practical wisdom of their forebears. Moving to the more pragmatic issues 
of designing software, we can watch as McCarthy and Wright bring the debate over the 
value of experience to one of today‘s concerns, Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), and 
the technology it embodies. ―We don‘t just use technology;‖ they write, ―we live with it. 
Much more deeply than ever before, we are aware that interacting with technology 
involves us emotionally, intellectually, and sensually‖ and try to uncover and ―provide 
foundations for a clearer analysis of user experience by developing a way of looking at 
technology as experience‖ (x). What became of the value Aristotle placed on experience, 
that we now have two authors, coming from what seem like two divergent perspectives, 
both trying to restore experience to our lives? 
 
I offer these two examples because they mirror two ancient concepts described by 
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. In Book VI he defines five states, or ways of 
coming to truth: practical wisdom (phronesis), art or craft (techné), scientific knowledge 
(episteme), philosophic wisdom (sophia) and intuitive reason (nous) (3; 15). The last two 
will be of little concern here as sophia refers to a contemplative life unconcerned with 
practical affairs, and nous pervades all the other four in equal measure. In other words, 
sophia is too particular, and nous too unique to be of practical value. The first two, 
practical wisdom and art or craft, are the operative elements in both Freeman and 
McCarthy and Wright. (The quest for scientific knowledge, as interpreted by Bacon, 
Locke, and others, has disrupted both to some degree.) But practical wisdom (phronesis), 
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and making (techné), have frequently been portrayed as incommensurate; two different 
ways of being that share only nous (intuitive reason) in their application. Practical 
wisdom is seen as inherently experiential; so much so that it cannot be taught, only 
learned. Techné, on the other hand, relies on a body of knowledge that is taught to the 
apprentice; in some respects making a bowl or a vase is a matter of trial and error guided 
by the master. 
 
McCarthy and Wright explain the problem as they see it: ―While there is a great deal of 
concern with user experience in the in Human-Computer Interaction and related fields...it 
is often unclear what is meant by this idea‖ (ix). While the need for user experience 
might be unclear to McCarthy and Wright, the idea that people need experience in their 
lives to become effective in the public sphere is hardly new. It has long been apparent 
that ―experience‖ is a necessary, though often overlooked, element in our relations with 
others.  
 
According to Edward P. J. Corbett (1995) both Aristotle and Isocrates were aware that 
practice—observing and imitating exemplary models—aided education (4). Aristotle 
believed that ―a young man is not the proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he 
is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life‖ (NE 1095a; 4), and more drastically that 
―If a man has the theory without the experience...he will often fail‖ (Meta.A1: 981; 20-
24). As Sipiora explains it, Isocrates techné chose to focus on the activity (praxis) of 
imitation and on the ―pragmatic value in shaping social cohesion and bonding as a way of 
promoting the continuity of cultural forms‖ (14).   
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But what are we as educators trying to do when we attempt to ―simulate‖ experience? 
The use of narratives (such as case studies) to simulate the experience of others has a 
long history in education. According to Geza Kardos and C.O. Smith (1979) case studies 
are ―an account of an...activity, event or problem containing some of the background and 
complexities actually encountered‖ in real life. Although they claim that in 1979 the use 
of case studies was new to engineering education, Clyde Herreid (1997) writes that ―the 
formal use of cases entered the academic scene at the turn of the century...at Harvard Law 
School.‖ 
 
But what is the nature of that which we seek to simulate; that is, what is it to 
―experience‖? Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004), in Truth and Method provides an interesting 
analysis of the history of the term. Beginning with the German word, Erlebnis, he relates 
that initially the meaning was ―to be there when something happened‖ which implies that 
―what is experienced is always what one has experienced oneself‖ (61). Reading that 
back against Freeman, it would seem entirely possible for the grown children of those 
veterans to have the experience walking in the places where their parents‘ walked. But 
the situation on beaches of Normandy is far different today than it was on D-Day. So 
these descendants have the experience of ―being there‖ but the ―something happening‖ is 
hardly similar. The permanent content of the experience, which Gadamer refers to as 
―Das Erlebte‖, is obviously one thing for the fathers, another thing for their children. 
Although both experiences are ―directly given‖, and both can become the ―material for 
imaginative creation‖ (62, citing Dilthey), the final form of that creation must be based 
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more on the material provided by those who were in the situation at the time than the 
imagination of those who were not if it is to maintain any verisimilitude. This 
information is not objective data in the scientific sense, these ―units of experience are 
themselves units of meaning‖ (65).  
 
Loss of the Value of Experience 
It seems possible that Gadamer is positioning Erlebnis here as a thing we acquire rather 
than as a process we undergo. One only has to look at his choice of words: ―what one has 
experienced‖, ―material‖, ―units of experience‖ and ―units of meaning‖, and particularly 
his read of ―Das Erlebte‖ as the permanent content of the experience. Das Erlebte is 
profound and unforgettable. But it is more likely that Gadamer is showing what he 
believes to be a devaluation of the concept of experience. By setting Erlebnis as what has 
become the more common everyday understanding of experience, he clears a space to 
later resurrect a richer, fuller concept of experience, i.e., ―Erfahrung‖.  
 
With Dilthey, Gadamer traces this objectification of experience to the time of the 
Industrial Revolution, when the impetus was to distance knowledge from its roots in 
nature and tradition. Martin Heidegger (1966), in a 1955 memorial address for the 
composer Conradin Kreutzer, presented a similar line of thought; foretelling equally dire 
results. He proposed that man is in a flight from thinking (45).  Beginning with the 
assertion that man‘s nature is to be ―a thinking, that is a meditating being‖ (47), he claims 
that modern technology—including radio, television, magazines, and even the memorial 
lecture he is embarking on—are seen as mere entertainment that require no reflective 
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thinking at all (44).  What has replaced reflective, meditative thinking is what Heidegger 
terms ―calculative thinking‖. It researches and plans. It organizes the situation we are in 
with the aim of achieving definite results. While meditative thinking is concerned with 
the ―thingness of things‖, calculative thinking is not. Heidegger relates the proclamation 
of eighteen Nobel laureates that ―Science is a road to a happier human life‖ (50). And 
Science, presumably, is the ultimate expression of calculative thinking. The attitude that 
Science will come to the rescue of modern man, that is fulfill his needs for fuel and other 
basic requirements, Heidegger demonstrates with a quote from the American chemist 
Stanley: ―The hour is near when life will be placed in the hands of the chemist who will 
be able to synthesize, split and change living substance at will‖ (52).  
 
Does this attitude still prevail? Is it accurate? I put this question to a chemist: Could a 
chemist analyze, split, then using chemistry synthesize (that is, re-create) the original 
substance? Say, for the sake of argument, a single malt Scotch? His answer was an 
unequivocal yes. But that certainty also came with certain provisos. 
 
The first difficulty was time, in that each analysis requires it. Some kinds of analysis are 
relatively quick, others may take days.  The second and somewhat related proviso was 
cost. Obviously, someone has to pay for the equipment, the chemicals involved, and for 
the time of the chemist doing the analysis. Finally, and perhaps the most important 
reservation (in that it complicates the first two), is knowing what to look for in the 
substance under analysis. Not only does each compound in the substance require a 
separate analysis, but the analyst must know which tests to run. That is, he or she must 
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have some inkling of what is in the substance, and from that decide the proper procedures 
to employ. That is, the chemist must know what is in the substance before starting the 
analysis. Chemical analysis is good at identifying the presence of an element within a 
substance, and the quantity/percentage of that element to the whole. But knowing what to 
look for in the first place may be more a matter of the experience for the chemist, and 
perhaps some measure of luck combined with technique. Paraphrasing Aristotle, 
technique loves chance, and chance loves good technique. 
 
This is not to say that the full analysis could not be done, theoretically. Given unlimited 
resources—time, money, and qualified personnel, it quite likely could be. But the 
substance in question would have to be extremely rare to justify the effort.  
 
Fortunately, Scotch whiskey is, excepting perhaps a few well-known brands, not all that 
rare; nor is it that hard to come by. As Murray (1997) relates in The Complete Guide to 
Whiskey, ―[T]he making of whiskey is not a difficult task. The making of a good 
whiskey, however, is another matter entirely‖ (8). Would the synthesis of the chemist 
produce a good whiskey? His response, far from the unequivocal yes at the theoretical 
possibility, was much less sure. The efficient, economical solution is to rely on the 
distillers‘ art, experience and technique. Will the creation of the ―Water of Life‖ ever be 
placed in the hands of the chemist to synthesize? Even with the promise of the 
rationalization, industrialization, and technology of modern life let us hope not. 
Interpreting Heidegger, the result of that kind of calculation and organization would 
surely produce something alien to the nature of Scotch, and to our nature as well.   
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In a similar vein Richard Rorty (1979), in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, argues 
that appreciation of experience was lost during the Enlightenment, when reliance on 
reason and the scientific method was seen as the way to discover the unassailable 
foundations of knowledge of the world. Rorty argues against even the possibility of these 
foundations. His notion of knowledge is that it comes to us through dialogue, in the same 
manner as ―acquiring a new virtue or skill by imitating models, a matter of phronesis 
rather than episteme‖ (319).   
 
Rorty‘s argument for pragmatism is complex, and well beyond the scope of this inquiry.  
But his quote above does allow entry into the subject, encompassing as it does the 
concepts of virtue, skill, imitation, and episteme. I will show that the loss of experience 
has roots older than the enlightenment. The way we know—or try to know—the world 
that comes down to us from John  Locke (and other major authors) incorporates versions 
of Aristotle‘s five forms of knowledge in a manner that established a hierarchy where: 
1. ―pure knowledge‖ (episteme) was reserved for scientists and academicians 
(themselves) 
2. making (techné) was privileged over doing (phronesis)  
3. and the value of experience fell through the cracks and was lost.  
This hierarchy is pervasive, and can be seen in philosophic thought long before the 
empiricism of Locke, and the ―new scientism‖ that was spawned by the enlightenment. 
The division between the ―ways of knowing‖ are perhaps most explicit in Aristotle, as 
stated above, but the pursuit of episteme as an elitist pastime is also found in the Platonic 
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vita contemplativa. Placing doing over making also has an elitist history: making was the 
province of craftsmen, who provided the necessities of life. With those necessities 
assured, doing—and deliberating on what was ―good to be done‖—was reserved for the 
few who ruled. Placing making over doing was especially appropriate for 
industrialization, as Arendt has claimed, when the masses became mere ―cogs in the 
machine.‖ (The epitome of this move can be seen in Taylor‘s scientific efficiency, where 
the knowledge of the craftsman is further reduced to a set of rules or procedures, and 
doled out from on high at the discretion of the privileged few.) 
 
However, for Aristotle, the hierarchy is not as clear-cut as some would have it.  Early in 
the Metaphysics he dwells on the relationship between theory and experience: ―If, then, a 
man has the theory without the experience...he will often fail‖ (Meta.A1: 981; 20-24). 
Yet a few lines later he valorizes the need for theory over experience, ―theory‖ in this 
passage referring to the body of knowledge an art or craft relies on:  
 
―But we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to 
experience, and we suppose artist to be wiser than men of experience (which 
implies in all cases that wisdom depends in all cases rather on knowledge); and this 
because the former know the cause, and the latter do not. For men of experience 
know that the thing is so, but do not know the why and the cause. Hence we think 
also that the master-workers in each craft are wiser than the manual workers, 
because they know the causes of the things that are done (we think the manual 
workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed, but act without knowing 
what they do, as fire burns—but while the lifeless things perform each of their 
functions by a natural tendency, the laborers perform them through habit); thus we 
view them as being wiser not in the virtue of being able to act, but of having the 
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theory for themselves and knowing the causes. And in general it is a sign of the 
man who knows and of the man who does not know, that the former can teach, and 
therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is; for artists can 
teach, and men of mere experience cannot.‖ (Meta.A1: 981a25-981b10) 
 
This passage foreshadows the split Aristotle imposes between techné (craft or art) and 
phronesis (practical wisdom acquired through experience) in the Nicomachean Ethics. In 
Book IV, chapter 4 he separates techné and phronesis ―the reasoned state of capacity to 
make is different from the reasoned state of capacity to act, hence too they are not 
included one in the other, for neither is acting making nor is making acting‖ (1140a, 1-6). 
 
Relating this loss to the academic sphere Robert J. Conners (1982), in ―The Rise of 
Technical Writing Instruction in America‖ agrees with this and suggests that courses in 
technical writing began with the increase in science and engineering training in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century (1860-1900). These courses, however, under the influence 
of the industrial revolution avoided an earlier emphasis on the ―classics of Greek and 
Roman philosophy‖ and turned to the more modern languages and liberal arts (334). 
Reacting to the perceived ―illiteracy‖ of engineers, engineering schools established 
English departments in the early 1900s and developed specialized writing courses to meet 
their needs—the ―first recognizable technical writing courses‖ (326).  Yet the rift 
between engineering and English departments continued and in 1923 Sada Harbarger‘s 
English for Engineers (who her editors listed only as S. A. Harbarger to avoid identifying 
her gender) featured technical forms (letters and reports)—that still remain the basis for 
many textbooks today (337). 
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Although the Hammond Reports of 1940 and 1944 called for more ―humanistic-stem 
courses—mostly literature, economics, history and social studies‖ to ―offset the narrow 
vocationalism of the engineering curriculum‖, it was not until the 1950s that this 
humanistic-stem movement ―won out‖ (340). Notably, in 1954 Mills and Walter began 
the pragmatic connection with the workplace that continues today when they based their 
Technical Writing on surveys of business and industry, and followed two basic 
assumptions: use a rhetorical rather than ―forms‖ approach and the pragmatic criterion of 
―does the technical writing work?‖ for the reader (342). But through the 1960s there 
remained a heavy emphasis on ―forms‖. The more humanistic rhetorically-based texts 
began to gain prominence in the early 1970s but were still not widely accepted.  
 
 But at the same time, for Gadamer there is also the aspect of experience as being lived 
through. The significance of experience comes from the way it alters us, not from its 
original content. Erlebnis contains, in some measure, the possibility of enriching us and 
maturing us, as when we undergo any ―test or trial‖ (69). But that enriching and 
maturing, I would argue, moves us into the realm of process. 
 
Another way to resolve this ―problem‖ of this devaluing of experience is to see it as an 
artifact of reading Aristotle incompletely, and focusing too much on chapter 6 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle offers this explanation at the beginning of Book 1: 
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject matter 
admits of. Now actions admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, and may 
be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise 
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to similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people...We must be content 
then in speaking of such subjects...to indicate the truth roughly (Bk 1, 3: 1094b;15-
20). 
 
What I take this to mean is that Aristotle, for his time a master of distinctions, is allowing 
for imprecision based on the nature of the subject. This is consistent with the rest of his 
work, in that both techné and phronesis deal with the variable, which, by definition, are 
―things that could be otherwise‖. We need to remember that Aristotle is not offering hard 
and fast definitions, because that is not possible, although it seems like it. He is offering 
description. 
 
Experience Revalued 
Admitting that the concept of experience is obscure, not quite 300 pages later Gadamer 
attempts to resolve some of these contradictions between product and a process by 
introducing another German term: experience as ―Erfahrung‖. Negatively viewing the 
attempts of science to objectify experience with rules, methods, and procedures, Gadamer 
argues that this removes the historical aspects, in that it ―takes no account of the inner 
historicity of experience‖ (346). Like a diminished techné, the diminished experience as 
understood by science and technology can hardly be considered rich experience, merely a 
set of data points.  
 
But those data points are also necessary, just as knowledge of material is necessary 
before techné can create something new. Likewise, they are valid, until contradicted by a 
new experience (350). For example, when replacing the exhaust system on a vehicle it is 
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common practice to cut the old parts off with an oxy-acetylene torch. In the hands of a 
skilled operator, the torch can slice through one layer of metal (the muffler) while leaving 
the underlying layer (the exhaust pipe) undisturbed and, more importantly, undistorted. In 
this way, the mechanic with experience can replace the bad part while saving the good 
part. This was the ―directly given‖ of the experience, valid based on multiple experiences 
with the material. Then one day the common experience was contradicted. The Ford 
Taurus, I believe it was, introduced the stainless steel exhaust.  
 
In a standard exhaust, the parts are made of mild steel, which is steel with a low carbon 
content. This makes the pipes relatively easy to bend and clamp. It also makes them 
relatively easy to cut with a torch, because when the technician heats the pipe to its 
melting point and adds oxygen, the iron in the steel oxidizes (think of really fast rusting) 
and is burnt away. But stainless steel, with its high content of chromium, will not oxidize 
in the presence of heat and oxygen. Much like the protective oxides that form on 
aluminum, the oxides that the chromium forms on the surface of the steel prevent it from 
rusting. This protective coating also prevents the flame and oxygen from reaching the 
underlying iron. When the flame cannot reach the iron there is no rapid oxidization, no 
burning away of the steel, i.e., no cutting.  The metal of the pipe simply puddles and drips 
in place. The Erlebnis-based old knowledge no longer worked. 
 
The above example illustrates Gadamer‘s meaning when he writes ―that life experience is 
clearly valid so long as it is not contradicted by new experience …is clearly characteristic 
of the nature of experience‖ whether in science or life (350). Life experience is not the 
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sum total of life or science, but it is a necessary condition of either. If the technician did 
not hold the experience of flame cutting, built up over many applications of torch to 
metal, he or she could hardly be called an experienced technician. Yet we must not view 
experience solely in terms of its result: the ability in this case to cut with an acetylene 
torch. As Gadamer suggests experience is a process, and one that is ―essentially negative‖ 
(353). 
 
When learning to cut, the new technician cannot rely on Erlebnis; he or she has not yet 
acquired that content. But some of it can be passed along. A more experienced technician 
will show the new one how to light the torch, adjust the flame, hold the flame at the 
proper angle to the metal, and what shade of red the metal should be before adding the 
essential burst of oxygen. The new tech is then given some scrap metal, often a discarded 
muffler, and told to go practice. At first, he will fail, and fail badly. The torch will go out 
and he will light it improperly (usually with a loud bang as result), he will cut too shallow 
or too deep, weld instead of cut. He will experience multiple negative outcomes of torch 
cutting. Yet through this practice, this process of Erfahrung, he or she will eventually 
acquire the Erlebnis (how the flame, metal, and angle should look, and the knowledge of 
what is a good result). When this happens, ―the experiencer has become aware of his 
experience; he has become ‗experienced‘. He has acquired a new horizon in which 
something can become an experience for him‖ (354). Then with that experience in hand, 
possessing that horizon, he will be ready for the next non-conforming experience (such as 
what to do about stainless steel exhaust systems), as long as he remains open to the 
experience. 
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Transitioning this renewed appreciation of experience into classroom practices, Carolyn 
R. Miller‘s (1979) ―A Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing‖ suggests we 
reexamine these positivist roots (outlined above) that have guided technical 
communication (and its pedagogy) and move to a more humanistic (consensual) basis. 
She argues that it is ―the common opinion that [it] is a ‗skills‘ course with little or no 
humanistic value is the result of a lingering but pervasive positivistic view of science…. 
an efficient way of coercing minds to submit to reality‖ (610). She recommends an 
approach that is ―more humanistic and less coercive‖ (611), one which sees knowledge as 
created, relative, rhetorical. The ―new epistemology‖ she describes, where ―[r]eality 
cannot be separated from our knowledge of it; knowledge cannot be separated from the 
knower; the knower cannot be separated from a community‖ (615) supports the view I 
will explore in detail later: that there is a phronetic (socially active) component to a rich 
techné that, like the positivist roots Miller posits, that is often overlooked in favor of 
technique. 
 
Almost as if she were writing from present-day Michigan Technological University, she 
claims that ―scientists, engineers, teachers of technical writing and their students tacitly 
share the positivist theory about the role of rhetoric in science. Consequently, students 
look upon writing as a superfluous, bothersome, and usually irrelevant aspect of their 
technical work‖ (615). The more critical part of her argument is that our teaching 
reinforces that view. 
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Adopting an Isocratean approach and foreshadowing later beliefs about the relationships 
between genre, community and social action, she writes that ―We can teach technical or 
scientific writing, not as a set of techniques for accommodating slippery words to 
intractable things, but as an understanding of how to belong to a community…to write 
well is to understand the conditions of one‘s own participation—the concepts, values, 
traditions and style which permit identification with that community and determine the 
success of failure or communication‖ (617).   
 
Russell Rutter‘s  (1991) ―History, Rhetoric, and Humanism: Toward a More 
Comprehensive Definition of Technical Communication‖ provides further insight to the 
origin those positivist beliefs, and, like Miller, he argues for a more humanistic 
conception of what he will call technical communication. Rutter echoes Newman‘s 
nineteenth century argument for a liberal education‘s value because it ―teaches that 
person to value ideas more than facts and systems and because it confers powers of 
persuasion and empathy without which cooperative endeavors remain impossible‖ (24).  
 
Yet contra Mills and Walter, Rutter believes that ―our role is not to simulate corporate 
training in the university classroom‖ (citing Winkler and Mizuno) for that would lead to 
the sort of courses that are, as Dobrin (2004) suggests ―so heavily mortgaged to 
pragmatism that it lacks cohesiveness and moral purpose?‖ (22). He suggests we teach 
the students to think well collaboratively, not only as individuals; and to converse, and so 
to participate in social life (following Bruffee). And of course, doing good in public is the 
cornerstone of a phronetic approach to life, or a good pedagogy. 
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In this, Rutter is in agreement with Dunne‘s objection to the modern worlds‘ attempt to 
see rationality as coextensive with technique (227). Both try to correct the situation by 
showing that theory (facts and systems) and experience (gained from participation in 
social life), far from being separate domains, have a connection (229); one suggested by 
Aristotle himself in the Metaphysics: theory, ―for all its primacy, does not displace 
phronesis as the ordering agent in our lives‖ (241).   
 
On Practical Experience (Or Is It Pragmatic?) 
Carolyn R Miller (1989), in ―What‘s Practical about Technical Writing‖ explores the 
theory/practice distinction as well. For Miller, phronesis is concerned with the practical, 
with getting things done, with efficient and effective action. Practical rhetoric therefore 
seems to concern the instrumental aspect of discourse—it‘s potential for getting things 
done—and at the same time to invite a how-to, or handbook, method of instruction. 
While we might consider this approach more pragmatic than practical, Miller argues that 
technical writing partakes of both these dimensions of practical rhetoric. However, while 
early Greek rhetoric also involved both dimensions, they ―emphasized that rhetoric was a 
techné…[which] initiated a handbook method of instruction‖ (14) which overshadowed 
the experiential aspects. 
 
She explains (following McKeon and Garver) that Aristotle‘s rhetoric may be ―practical 
[phronetic], rather than theoretical [epistemic] or productive [techné]‖ (22). She argues 
that as academics and instructors, we should appreciate that a phronetic method can 
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create knowledge and work toward the communal good. Like both Rutter and Dobrin, she 
argues that we should not just replicate existing practices, thereby making our students 
―more valuable to industry‖, we should ―question those practices and teach [students] to 
do so too‖ (23). 
 
McCarthy and Wright pursue a similar end in their program to incorporate human values 
in the design of technology. But where Mitcham leans heavily on the rational and logical; 
and Dunne tries with arguable success to restore the human to ―human action,‖ McCarthy 
and Wright begin with the recognition that, while experience has come to be a favorite 
child of those seeking to understand and design technology, the ―turn to practice...has 
become heavily laden with theoretical and methodological encumbrances‖ (42). In saying 
this, they avoid falling prey to the same trap that Dunne configures: to argue against 
instrumentalism with the tools of instrumentalism.  The tools they offer for analyzing felt 
experience draw on John Dewey and Mikhail Bakhtin‘s use of aesthetics as ―the 
paradigm of rich experience‖ and, with them, hope to ―restore the continuity between 
aesthetic and ordinary experience‖ (79) . They present these not as foundational; rather, 
their ―four threads of experience‖ are ―ideas to help us think more clearly about  
technology as experience‖ (79). These threads are the sensual, the emotional, the 
compositional, and the spatio-temporal. The sensual refers to being involved pre-
reflectively; that is, responding to our situation based on what our senses provide us: a 
child-like engagement with the on-going. They use the emotional thread to look at the 
quality of a particular experience based on the values, needs, goals, and desires of the 
person involved. The compositional thread is ―concerned with the relationship between 
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the parts and the whole of an experience‖ (87). Here, we examine the situation as we 
might a novel, or a movie. Do the parts hang together? What makes this one engaging, 
where another is not? Does it make sense; why or why not? What makes us care about it: 
is it something in the situation, or something in ourselves?  The fourth thread, the spatio-
temporal, examines how an experience alters our sense of space and time. Becoming 
engrossed in a novel, or a computer application, we might lose the perception of space 
around us; our world collapses to the event before us. Or talking on a cell-phone, we 
might forget the public space we inhabit as we think of only our ―private‖ conversation. 
An experience might cause our time-sense to change as well; a few minutes in the 
dentist‘s chair can seem like hours. 
 
After thinking through an experience in terms of the four threads, McCarthy and Wright 
give the next step as ―putting it into circulation‖ (118, citing Turner) by writing 
―narratives of experience‖. Admitting the problems inherent in constructing any 
narrative, creating and deploying case studies holds the promise of accomplishing what 
Dunne argues for, a way to teach practical wisdom. Reading these case studies can 
provide a simulation of what the experience felt like—at least from one viewpoint—that 
otherwise might be obtainable only through direct experience. In a classroom, using case 
studies can allow students to become virtual participants in an experience. The reflection 
on and discussion of that participation that follows the exercise can be the initial steps of 
the students ability to develop the theory behind the actions on their own, an ability tat 
will hopefully continue to improve over time. 
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Can We Teach Phronetically 
The difficulty here is that, for all the desirability of a phronetic approach to technical 
communication instruction, most authors have overlooked a basic dilemma. In particular 
Dunne,  arguing in favor of phronetic approach, recommends that ―an important role 
should be given to practicing teachers who are not only phronomoi but are also well 
equipped to teach apprentice-teachers to become phronomoi‖ (370). Unfortunately, 
according to Aristotle, phronesis is not teachable; it can only be gained through 
experience (Meta.A1: 981a25-981b10). So, while Miller tries to carve out a space for the 
practical, ultimately her program seems more pragmatic than phronetic. 
 
Janet M. Atwill‘s (1993) ―Instituting the Art of Rhetoric: Theory, Practice, and 
Productive Knowledge in Interpretations of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric‖ also examines 
Aristotle‘s three ―orders of knowledge‖, but comes to a very different conclusion than 
Dunne and Miller. Her goal is to make a space for a model of rhetoric (which is at the 
core of our technical communication pedagogy) based on productive knowledge (techné). 
But first she needs to disabuse us of the long-standing tradition of a theory/practice 
binary; that is, she shows that rhetoric is neither solely a practical art (as proposed by 
Cope in the 19
th
 century); nor is it primarily a theoretical one (as suggested by Grimaldi 
in the 20
th 
).  
 
Atwill frames Grimaldi‘s take on rhetoric as a ―paradigmatic example of epistemological 
foundationalism‖ (105). More useful is her explication of Cope‘s focus on rhetoric‘s 
relation to politics, its ‗action‘ over its ‗production‘ (101). Cope identifies ―the ‗practical‘ 
quality of the art not only with ‗acting‘ but also with ‗experience‘‖, where (much like 
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Isocrates view of techné) ―memory, by repetition…gives rise to experience, empeiria, 
and from it proceeds art, and ultimately science‖ (based on Metaphysics 980a27-981a2) 
(103). Still, while Cope looks for principles, not process (105), his description of the 
process provides insight on how we might use Atwill‘s argument for a productive 
knowledge model that does not require a stable object of knowledge, eschews 
―description‖ and ―interpretation‖ in favor of construction, and ―never attempts to 
overcome the contingencies of time and circumstance‖ (113). As a means to teach 
through techné, her view of ―making‖ incorporates aspects drawn from the more 
relativistic area of phronesis. 
 
Dale Sullivan (1990), exploring the ―Political-Ethical Implications of Defining Technical 
Communications as a Practice‖ also begins with the observation that writing instruction 
has lost touch with its traditions, and begun to ―indoctrinate students, turning them into 
the sorts of people who will fill the available slots in our technological society‖ (212). Or, 
as Rutter eloquently puts it  
focusing on the culture as an entity into which writers must fit themselves is similar 
to focusing on model reports as containers into which writers must fit their 
materials…[N]either really addresses the question of what a technical 
communicator will be. If fitting information into pre-existent content outlines is 
supplemented only by an emphasis on fitting new graduates into pre-existent 
cultures, I do not think the result will be progress‖ (30). 
 
Rhetoric, as deployed in technical communications, is sometimes reduced to teaching 
skills—an ―impoverished‖ techné—that are separable from both maker and made, 
―relieving the writer of responsibility‖ (213, citing Halloran). But Sullivan argues, like 
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Miller (1979), for a richer version, an ―enculturation‖ model, albeit one that enculturates 
them to a particular genre/workplace. While the addition of the social aspect is an 
improvement, Sullivan poses the moral question: ―What are we enculturing our students 
into?‖ (213).  
 
Sullivan concludes that the genre we indoctrinate our students into is the military-
industrial complex (214), and following C. Miller advises using praxis (action) for the 
definition of technical communications instead of techné (forms) since, at least in the 
classic sense, the praxis/phronesis connection with virtue as the ability to deliberate 
about the public good (rather than the mere expediency of techné) insures responsible 
social action. (214). 
 
His resolution has been to adapt his course to teach the ―real‖ world while also making 
students ―aware of the values embedded in [it] and the dehumanizing effects of it‖ (215) 
by using an ―apprenticeship model of teaching‖ that positions the teacher as ―master‖ in 
the relationship (217). However, his practical solution of teaching forms first then ethics 
later is problematic, although common. Too often the discussion of ethics is relegated to 
the end of the course, added on as what might seem to be an afterthought, and presented 
when the students are more concerned with completing projects, papers, and worrying 
about final exams. In other words, their focus is elsewhere. Is there a way to do both 
simultaneously? 
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Valuing Genre as the Site of Phronetic Action 
Sullivan credits the ―enculturation to a genre‖ he refers to as based in Carolyn Miller‘s 
1984 ―Genre as Social Action‖, widely cited as ―seminal‖ in the way rhetoric—and 
technical communication—has come to consider genre studies. Yet it seems that her 
emphasis on action has fallen by the wayside in favor of a textual and/or situational 
definition.  
 
Her oft-quoted definition ―genres as typified rhetorical actions based in recurrent 
situation‖ (159) sets the stage for a collaborative model of the workplace, one that can 
(hopefully) be learned. But she points out the notion of genre has become problematic 
due to its local and individual nature; yet, it remains ―a rhetorical means for mediating 
private intentions and social exigence; it motivates by connecting the private with the 
public, the singular with the recurrent‖ (163). 
 
Her focus on genre may be an answer to teaching phronetically. Studying genres allows 
the admittance of form and action, and ties both to the community in which they arise, 
hopefully for the betterment of all.  ―For the student,‖ she writes. ―genres serve as keys to 
understanding how to participate in the actions of a community‖ (165). Yet, as Freedman, 
Adam, and Smart (1994) suggest, explicit teaching about genres seems difficult, if not 
impossible. Teaching about genres, as we shall see in the discussion of teaching about 
experience, requites a different approach. 
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Learning Theories 
Three major theoretical positions can inform how we come to learn genres. From a 
practical standpoint, Lave and Wenger (1991) in Situated Learning explore a pedagogical 
level. Their question concerns how learning takes place, and how to make it more 
effective. The process they call ―legitimate peripheral participation‖, and their statement 
that ―learners inevitably participate in communities of practitioners‖ (29) fits precisely 
with our goal; to provide our students tools and methods to first recognize and fit into 
those communities, and eventually effect positive change within them.  
 
Anthony Giddens (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory proposes a ―duality of 
structure‖ wherein we both know the rules of society and at the same time participate in 
their construction and maintenance. Defining ―action‖ as ―a stream of actual or 
contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-
in-the-world‖ (55), Giddens provides a complete, if lengthy, explication of what Aristotle 
meant by acting. Relating this intervention to the ―more generalized notion of Praxis‖ 
(56) places his formulation of the process well within the Aristotelian, for whom praxis 
can be an operation of practical wisdom. Giddens claims the actor in this situation is 
possessed of ―practical consciousness, which is tacit knowledge embodied in what actors 
know how to do‖. Opposed to this is his ―discursive consciousness…What actors are able 
to ‗talk about‘ and in what manner or guise they are able to talk about it (73)‖. If we can 
talk about it, presumably, we can teach it, it must be techné. Yet his emphasis on action, 
temporality and contingency harken to praxis and when deployed for the common good 
(which is not necessarily always the case for Giddens) phronesis. 
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Pierre Bourdieu (1977), in Outline of a Theory of Practice, like Atwill and many others, 
wishes to move us away from the structuralist/foundationalist theory side of the binary. 
His solution is to position practice as the proper way of being in and understanding the 
world; that the privileging of science (theory) leads to a neglect of the social conditions 
that make science possible (1). 
 
 Bourdieu, writing to modify the classic anthropological perspective, wants to break with 
objectivism, which ―grasps practices from the outside‖, in favor of ―constructing their 
generative principle…within the very moment of their accomplishment‖ in order to 
establish a ―science of the dialectical relationship‖ between structure and the dispositions 
that actualize and reproduce them (3). So for Bourdieu the binary is still there, and while 
theory has a place, it is not privileged one. As for Atwill, knowledge is construed in the 
relation to specific conditions at a specific time.  
 
Bourdieu‘s theory does not view action as ―mere execution of the model‖ which can lead 
us to an ―imaginary‖ outcome (we think we represent subjective purpose as the objective 
meaning (30)), rather in the richer sense of practices as something people make and do: 
―the product of strategies (conscious or unconscious) oriented towards the satisfaction of 
material and symbolic interests‖ within a specific situation (36).   
 
Similar to Giddens ―Duality of Structure‖, Bourdieu‘s ―Habitus‖ (systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions) mediates between structures and practices. These principles 
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can be objective without being bound to rules, fitted to their goals with or without a 
conscious intent or an ―express mastery‖ of procedure, and collectively orchestrated 
without the need of a conductor (72). ―Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy-nilly, is 
a producer and reproducer of objective meaning‖ (79). Important to any discussion of 
teaching phroneticly is the distinction ―wittingly or unwittingly‖. If we read wittingly 
against Giddens notion of discursive consciousness (what actors are able to ‗talk about‘ 
consciously) we are close to a definition of the knowledge of techné—a reasoned state 
that can be explained and taught. Unwittingly, however, read against Giddens sense of 
practical consciousness (tacit knowledge embodied in what actors know how to do) is 
more at home within phronesis, knowledge that comes to be internalized through 
experience rather than explicitly taught.  
  
Further, Bourdieu gives us one possible route to this type of learning, one that resonates 
well with Sullivan‘s call: ―Between apprenticeship through simple familiarization, and, at 
the other extreme, explicit and express transmission by precept and prescription, every 
society provides for structural exercises tending to transmit this or that form of practical 
mastery‖ like riddles and ritual contests, challenges, and ―let‘s pretend‖, people learn ―the 
schemes generating the strategies of honor‖ (89).  
 
 
Teaching Phronetically: Classroom Practice 
Much has been written about various styles of technical communication pedagogy. My 
purpose here is to review some of these through two lenses: first, how the authors might 
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place them into Aristotle‘s theory-practice-production classifications, and secondly what 
the authors have found advantageous about their respective methods as they relate to the 
theorists discussed above. 
 
Aviva Freedman‘s (1993) ―Show and Tell? The Role of Explicit Teaching in the 
Learning of New Genres‖ asks ―can explicit teaching of features of genre enhance 
students‘ acquisition? Her ―strong hypothesis‖ says that no, ―explicit teaching is neither 
necessary nor useful (if even possible)‖. Her ―restricted hypothesis‖ is less harsh, 
answering the question with a resounding ―maybe‖ for certain students, certain subjects, 
and certain circumstances (222). Explicit teaching would reside in the theoretical side of 
the theory-practice-production classification; the teaching of rules, forms, and 
prescription.  
 
Freedman uses genre in Miller‘s sense, but in a somewhat reductionist way. She saw that 
her students discovered the rules of a genre, but made no attempt to formulate them 
(229). Her claim that ―genre knowledge is tacit‖ (231) is similar to Giddens ―practical 
knowledge‖, whom she cites. Essentially, the students learn the rules, but not in a way 
that they can articulate them. In Giddens terms, they lack ―discursive knowledge‖. She 
adds that this tacit knowledge is unavailable to the ―master‖ as well: ―Control of 
craftsmanship, or techné does not necessarily entail conscious learning or explicit 
formulation of rules‖ (236) which seems a bit overstated in both my read of Aristotle and 
my experience—unless you put an awful lot of stress on the ―necessarily‖—but does 
align well with Bourdieu.  
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With the same goal as the reflective exercises we have our students complete, Freedman 
recognizes that ―Full genre knowledge…only becomes available as a result of having 
written‖ [avoiding the question of whether we can ever have ―full genre knowledge‖]. 
Achieving this reflection adds a phronetic aspect to an otherwise explicit approach.  
 
But when she continues with ―meta-awareness [discursive knowledge] can flower into 
conscious, reflective knowledge‖ (236-7) she seems to contradict her earlier belief that 
knowledge stays tacit. Unfortunately, for all her discussion of  phronesis and techné,  
Freedman never seems clear on whether she is talking about a model based on practice or 
production; her recommendation that guided participation take place in the situational 
context suggests a mix of both where teachers  set up ―facilitative environments‖ where 
they can ―stage‖ the context (238).  
 
Her ―Rejoinder‖ to one critic only muddies the waters. She claims that learning is 
phronetic (273) but she attributes the ability explicitly only to teachers. Apparently 
students are not capable of this type of learning. In this, she would seem to agree with 
Aristotle, in that phronesis is not available to the youth, who have not yet acquired the 
requisite experience. However, in the next breath she disagrees with Aristotle (and 
countless others), arguing that teaching a craft does not require explicit explication. These 
comments seem to demonstrate if not an inadequate understanding of the concepts she 
explores, then at least some confusion in communicating them. 
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Freedman, joined by Christine Adam and Graham Smart (1994) refine their argument for 
a phronetic approach in ―Wearing Suits to Class: Simulating Genres and Genres as 
Simulations‖. They start to respond to Miller‘s 1979 call for human action with the 
recognition that ―discourse is shaped by the anticipated hearer/reader‘s response [and] 
other elements in the textual, social, cultural and political context‖ (197), but move the 
stress from all action to just the reader‘s response to a text (197). Where Miller seeks to 
expand the notion of genre to feature its dynamic aspects, Freedman seems content to 
bury ―action‖ in a long list of attributes (198). 
 
Also, they note the use of simulation is seen as ―superficial‖ by both students and 
instructor. As one student explains ―Did you notice how he [the instructor] keeps looking 
out the window a lot?‖ (203). Perhaps their simulations are just not real enough.   
 
They provide a useful distinction between workplace and academic writing: ―For those 
whose goals are action oriented, writing is instrumental; for those whose goals are 
epistemic [learning], the writing is its own end‖ (citing Willard 1982), although their 
confusion about Aristotle‘s divisions continues. They note that the students were ―never 
deceived‖ that their writing was epistemic (203) while ―in the workplace, by contrast, it is 
the [action proposed by] the text that is paramount‖ (207). 
 
They also report research by Giltrow and Valiquette (in press) ―that students are expected 
to spell out explicitly some of [their] knowledge‖ and ―student writing is the knowing 
made manifest for inspection…even to the extent of boredom for the reader‖ (205). This 
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is a good fit with both Giddens explicit/discursive, and what I have termed the 
―teacherly‖ role I have seen some professors assume when they try to simulate a client.  
Even their industry consultant adopts this style when serving as a part-time instructor, 
and becomes more concerned about the student‘s learning than the task itself.   
Finally, although they claim  that the wearing of suits was ―emblematic [and] enabled a 
stance towards experience, a way of construing reality that matched that of the ‗suits‘ of 
the workplace‖ (220), they end with the not very hopeful belief that students must be in a 
real situation: ―None of this know-how will have been made available through 
simulations, no matter how realistically or elaborately staged‖ (221), and ―only through 
exposure to relevant professional contexts…will writers acquire the genres appropriate to 
these milieus‖ (222) 
 
Joseph Dunne‘s Back to the Rough Ground (1993), discusses the difficulties with the 
―behavioral objectives model‖ he sees as on the loose in the school system. His concern 
is the instrumentalist underpinnings of this method, where all problems of teaching are 
reduced to finding the most effective means available (1). His answer is to avoid this 
―lure of technique‖ in favor of a more experiential, phronetically based approach. His 
penultimate chapter is devoted to the experiential aspect of techné. In it he shows that, far 
from the more common understanding that making and doing are mutually exclusive, 
Aristotle suggests several ways they can be seen as coextensive. 
 
Does this attitude mean we have to give up on teaching experience in either practice or 
production mode, and fall back to prescriptive lecturing on theory? Perhaps not, as  
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Freedman & Adam (1996) suggest when they revisit the topic in ―Learning to Write 
Professionally: ‗Situated Learning‘ and the Transition from University to Professional 
Discourse‖. While still believing in the distinction between workplace and academic 
writing, and not wholly rejecting the impossibility of simulating real-world experience in 
the classroom, they pursue what they see as a more attainable goal: to teach students how 
to learn new genres, as opposed to the genre itself (395).   
 
Building on Rogoff‘s guided participation and Vygotsky‘s apprenticeship models (398), 
and Lave and Wenger‘s Legitimate Peripheral Participation (apprenticeship with an end 
focused ―on something other than learning‖, ―a purpose above and beyond the initiations 
of newcomers‖ (399)), they seem to be moving away from a phronetic mode and toward 
one that is production based. Or perhaps, like Atwill, they are proposing using techné-
based methods to foster the students ability to learn phronetically.  
 
They identify some important differences between the school and workplace writing 
experiences. In the classroom learning takes place through what they call ―Facilitated 
Performance‖ where the guide/instructor is ―oriented entirely to the learner and to the 
learner‘s learning [with] no explicit direction by the guide‖ (403). Rather, the guide 
collaboratively ―models‖ an appropriate approach and ―after students struggled with it‖ 
(403), provided ―corrective feedback‖ (404). Eventually, students ―reproduced discipline-
specific terms‖ (406) and thinking.  
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Contrasted with the more phronetic method of the institution, in the workplace learning 
draws on techné‘s ability to accommodate chance and is achieved through ―Attenuated 
Authentic Participation‖, which is similar, but, ―all the more significant for being tacit 
and implicit, complicating the transition into the workplace‖ (408). Learning takes place 
―through active processes (in this case writing), guided by mentors, and mediated through 
cultural tools‖ [word processors and software] (409). However, ―the differences are the 
nature‖ of the collaboration [and in] the improvisatory nature of the task [―not carefully 
sequenced and designed‖ (413), as in classroom], the task‘s authenticity and validity, and 
the ―varied and shifting roles played by the mentor and learner‖ [which newcomer must 
learn, and learn ―from whom they can learn‖ it (415)]. The tasks are focused on external 
goals; learning is incidental, participants unaware of it (410).  
 
Clay Spinuzzi (1996), in ―Psuedotransactionality‖, while critiquing Freedman & Adam‘s 
―classroom writing‖ as ―pseudo‖, actually adopts a similar stance on the internal/external 
ends of classroom/workplace writing, and the teaching practices associated with each.  
With some non-specified references to Bourdieu‘s ―habitus‖—or something very much 
like it—(343, 344) as definition of ―activity network‖ (AN) he suggests that while we 
can‘t simulate workplace activity network, what we do do is prepare minds so they will 
be better able to cope when they go into workplace (345) 
 
He advocates having students join other AN‘s (like Enterprise, USG, or other student 
groups) then discussing difference(s) in the writing classroom (346), but interestingly 
notes that ―the particular AN is not important‖: the idea is to gain generalizable skills 
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through analysis. As a way to avoid the contradiction inherent in trying to teach 
phronesis, he transforms our job from ―teacher‖ to ―analysis guider‖ in the manner of a 
master technite. While an interesting and potentially valuable approach, Spinuzzi‘s 
emphasis on moving knowledge from Giddens practical to discursive dimensions lets 
content and structure slip by the wayside, in much the same way the process movement in 
composition was accused of doing.  
 
Two articles by Ann Blakeslee explore the issue of using production-based projects to 
foster phronetic learning. ―Activity, Context, Interaction and Authority: Learning to 
Write Scientific Papers in Situ‖ (1997) follows the interactions (conversation and written) 
of a graduate student and his physics professor/mentor as the student tries to write his 
first article. Whether her inquiry in an academic setting generalizes that well to an 
―advanced professional‖ one is problematic; but she does not address that.   
 
She uses a ―situated learning‖ (apprenticeship) model and suggests that participation in a 
domain ―teaches students to perform the domains activities: Learning thus occurs through 
doing‖ (135). While this is phronetic, often she displays a poor understanding of 
techné/phronesis. For example, her statement that the goal of apprenticeships, per 
situated learning theorists, ―is to transmit knowledge and authority to beginners‖ (126) 
would be more techné than phronesis. As is her contention that ―scaffolding, then, is 
support, provided as needed, to help newcomers perform unfamiliar tasks‖ (140) by 
setting appropriate ―intermediate‖ tasks. 
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She found that the professors/mentors ―indirect and implicit‖ manner of support impedes 
student progress (141), in a way similar to what Freedman and Adam found in the 
workplace. Yet the professor‘s ―indirectness‖ was deliberate. He responded in this 
manner, he said, so that [the student] could ―gain experience addressing and responding 
to the problems in the test on his own‖ (142). The student saw this not as instruction, but 
as ―input‖ from someone who knew the task better. For the professor, then, this is a very 
techné way to go about it, but the student appears to be learning phronetically. Blakeslee 
values this combined approach since ―Not being prescriptive can help the students be 
more creative…prescriptive or cookbook approaches…militate against such creativity‖ 
(145).  
 
We can also see one limitation of Giddens practical/discursive consciousness here. When 
the professor expects the student to come to practical awareness on his own by refusing 
to provide discursive advice, the students progress suffers. Better, I think, are her 
suggestions to ―provide greater support and direction to help students undertake and 
perform new tasks‖ and ―make more explicit the aims and goals of the process‖ (158), at 
least at the beginning of instruction.  
 
Blakeslee‘s ―Bridging the Workplace and the Academy: Teaching Professional Genres 
through Workplace Collaborations‖ (2001) explores ―how classroom-workplace 
collaborations help us to teach professional genres…how they replicate workplace 
activities and convey features of  workplace genres and how they serve as transitional 
experiences‖ (169). She identifies and explores four issues that can inform our pedagogy: 
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exposure, authenticity, transition, and response (170), and how they can make our 
attempts to simulate experience more effective.  
 
By working with real clients, on real projects, students gain exposure to workplace (176), 
and although the students may view the projects as artificial, they still see some 
authenticity (178) in them. In order to facilitate the transition from the classroom to the 
office, Blakeslee recommends that we not remove all frustration from the projects (182), 
but ―allow students to carry out tasks [from] workplace, but in a supportive environment‖ 
(183). Finally, she found that the students were dissatisfied with client feedback (186); 
the clients responses did not include enough direction and tended to be either overly 
critical or overly complementary (187-8). She suggests that instructors may need to train 
clients (189), a finding in agreement with my observations of client/student interactions 
as well.  
 
As in her earlier work, we can see how the paucity of response by the client, while 
sometimes less than well-intentioned, leads us to see the value of providing some 
discursive awareness. However, there does seem to be a requirement of some ambiguity 
if learning is to proceed phronetically.   
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Chapter Three: Theory Applied 
In this chapter I move away from the strictly theoretical aspects, and examine how the 
concepts of techné (making through poiesis) and phronesis (good activity, praxis, 
informed through experience) can be seen in more practical applications. First, I look at 
the Seabase case study, drawing out how the students‘ actions can be interpreted in terms 
of those concepts. Secondly, I look at how the actions of students in Technical 
Communication courses can be classified in those same terms
1
.  
 
Making and Acting: Theorizing One Case 
The significance of the concepts of making (techné) and acting (phronesis) can be made 
clear by looking for their presence in the cases. Often, individuals will have difficulty 
separating what they make from how they act, but this ability can be critical to success in 
the classroom and, by extension, in the workplace. The Challenger disaster is a case in 
point. From a communication standpoint, the engineers involved became too focused on 
making the flight happen and not passing on bad news (Winsor 1988) that they 
overlooked whether they would be acting ethically for the greater good (Gross and 
Walzer 1997). The following examples demonstrate that difference and how the case 
studies can bring these concepts to light, and make them useful as heuristics to guide 
what we make and how we act, increasing effectiveness in both areas.  
                                                 
1
 The material in this section includes previously published selections from ―Making and Acting: 
Ethnographic Development of a Case Study Approach‖. This first appeared in Technical Communication in  
2008 and was reprinted in Qualitative Research in Technical Communication in 2011.  
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In the ―Seabase‖ case study, Software Engineering Senior Design students (called the 
―SE team‖) worked to develop software to control a ship-mounted crane. The crane 
would be used to transfer loads from one ship to another while at sea, and be controlled 
by a joystick, much like a video game. The SE team would write a program that would 
compensate for the rolling of the ocean, making the crane easier to use for the operator. 
The collaborative project with mechanical engineering faculty and students was at times 
overwhelming. The SE Team had to learn to program in a new language, Matlab, and to 
navigate the culture of Mechanical Engineers as well. As new members of an ongoing 
project, they had to make both their controller and their place in an established, yet to 
them foreign, work environment. 
 
Making the controller seemed straightforward to the SE Team. As one member described 
the situation when interviewed at the end of the project: 
Question: 
What product are you making?  
Answer: 
We're supposed to port code, existing C-code into a "Matlab" format. Basically the 
code is supposed to stabilize a payload for the crane. It was pretty vague in the 
beginning. We thought we were going to actually be designing the code, whereas 
we end up to find out we‘re just like porting some existing code… 
 
We can see from his answer that at the beginning of the project, this self-described 
―technical guy‖ was concerned about the scope of the task: designing the code seemed 
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formidable, merely porting it well within their ―capacity to make.‖ But complicating the 
task was the ―acting‖ aspect, working with others in an unfamiliar situation. This excerpt 
from the case, shown in Figure 3.1, captures the difficulty. 
Module C Story 
On Wednesday of the fourth week of the semester (Sept. 22) the leaders of the three 
crane project teams meet with project advisors Hank Taylor and Nancy Smith. They 
decide that since the ―point of meeting is to get regular coordination of the teams, 
they will continue the meeting of team leaders on Wednesday from 12-1 on‖. 
Representing the SE Team are JoAnn, Ken and Bob; Matt and Ben come for the crane 
builders; and Jon is there to talk about the platform. 
Minutes of Sept. 22 Crane Team Leaders meeting 
The items on JoAnn‘s summary of the meeting are: 
 The SE Team will work on crane, not on the platform, this term. 
 In a discussion of scope of the SE Team‘s part, Hank says the crane part is the 
―biggest, nastiest part‖ and he thinks the GUI for the platform will take about an hour 
and is the easiest part. 
Figure 3.1. Excerpt from Module C Story, Seabase case study. 
 
As an example of how we presented this scenario in the case study, the hyperlink to an 
email from one project advisor in mechanical engineering is available only after 
following the hyperlink to the meeting minutes shown in the excerpt. To get to this 
information, the undergraduate students analyzing the case must dig into and ferret out 
the information, much like the SE Team had to do at the time. This adds to the 
effectiveness of the case as a simulation of real life, when not everything is presented 
clearly and immediately.  The email highlights an all-too-common problem when 
working with others. The two advisors, in their roles of clients, hold differing opinions on 
what should be the most difficult part of the project. Advisor Hank Taylor feels ―the 
crane [controller] is the ‗biggest, nastiest‘ part‖ and a side project to design a GUI is ―the 
easiest part.‖ However, one week before, Advisor Nancy Smith indicated the opposite: 
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―The GUI design is a good project for the SE team,‖ and ―working on only the crane 
controller would be ‗too simple.‘‖ The questions posed to the student users of the case 
(excerpted in Figure 3.2) ask them to reflect on and offer solutions to this disparity. 
Module C Questions 
1.How would you characterize the interactions among Hank, Nancy, and the team 
members? 
2.It's interesting that Hank says that the ―crane part‖ is going to be ―the biggest, nastiest 
part‖, and that   the GUI design will be easiest. On the other hand, Nancy seems to be 
saying the opposite: the controller will not be very difficult, and the GUI will be 
more challenging.  
 Why might they have such different opinions? 
 How can the SE team resolve this difference? 
Figure 3.2 Module C Questions, Seabase case study. 
 
This exemplifies the dilemma of working with others while trying to promote a common 
good. The arena of acting is too dependent on the particulars of the situation; it cannot be 
codified into a set of rules, condensed into a ―how to‖ manual, as the making of a product 
often can be. The multitude of variables involved helps explain the difficulty of teaching 
phronesis directly. Aristotle‘s ―capacity to act‖ and do what is appropriate in any 
situation can only be gained by experiencing a variety of situations and reflecting on 
them.  
 
Never would we argue that teaching ―making‖ is easy—we know it is not. It is just that 
teaching the aspects of life that comprise ―acting‖ directly is impossible: what rules, what 
universals are there to rely on and pass on to students when it comes to human 
interactions? It is only through experience and imitation that we learn how to act well. 
The richness and immediacy of our cases provide a path to simulating the experience of 
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the workplace. In responding to the excerpt above, students must put themselves in the 
place of the SE Team and learn how to deal with the particulars of the situation. It is here 
we find the value of our ethnographically developed case studies, and our theorizing of 
them through the concepts of making and acting. 
 
Simulating workplace actions in the Classroom  
We have successfully used our case studies in both technical communication ―service‖ 
courses where the students come from a variety of majors and in software engineering 
classrooms where a much more homogeneous audience receives the cases. The depth of 
the cases helps simulate the complexity of working on a collaborative software project, 
and their breadth helps to hold the interest of students from other disciplines. While our 
initial focus was on improving communication skills, here we look deeper to see how the 
concepts of making and acting have facilitated that endeavor. The examples I offer here 
draw on the first use of the Seabase case study in technical communication classes, where 
the heterogeneity of the audience more accurately reflects a typical workplace than does 
the homogeneity of a software engineering class. This interdisciplinary service course 
typically attracts students majoring in technical communication, business, engineering, as 
well as software engineering and computer science. Here I report specifically on two 
trials, summer 2006 (a two-and-a-half-week unit out of seven weeks) and fall 2006 (a 
four-week unit out of fourteen). We (the instructor and I) were fortunate in that each 
interdisciplinary team working on the case included a software engineering or computer 
science student. The overall goal of the unit was to analyze the multiple communications 
efforts of the SE team (including emails, meeting minutes, timelines, requirements 
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documents, risk documents, reports, and presentations) as they developed the software for 
the crane controller. Specific assignments included writing memos and final reports, and 
preparing for in-class discussions.   
 
Making/Techné 
In one exercise the technical communication students considered and discussed the 
purpose(s) and audience(s) for a given set of meeting minutes.  They then rewrote the 
minutes to improve their usefulness as a record of the meeting and as a report to other 
stakeholders.  This production can be read as techné, the reasoned capacity to make. For 
both the SE team developing the controller software and the technical communication 
class members reviewing the actions of that team, creating these documents contributed 
to their communication skills. The skills of the SE team, unfortunately, never seemed to 
progress much past Dreyfus‘ novice stage. Their reliance on rules and procedures led to 
confusion and, ultimately, failure.  
 
The technical communication students, on the other hand, by vicariously experiencing 
and reflecting on the efforts of the SE team, began to move beyond just competence. 
Their analysis of the situation led to alternative, more appropriate ways to create the 
documents. They began to master the art of technical communication. Where the SE team 
would create documentation almost by rote (their attitude being ―this is what the 
instructor or client wants‖), the technical communication students saw the value of the 
documentation to their own efforts (for example, they created a timeline because they 
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knew it would help guide the project, not just because it was required). Like Aristotle, we 
value the masters of their crafts ―because they know the reasons of the things which are 
done; … Thus the master craftsmen are superior in wisdom, not because they can do 
things, but because they possess a theory and know the causes‖ (Meta 981b1).  
 
The students also demonstrate a discursive awareness of their skill, in that not only can 
they find and repair inadequacies in the documents, they can explain why they are 
important. Wild begins his definition of techné as ―any act that can give a rational 
account of itself, explaining why it does what it is doing‖ (p. 256). In compiling a final 
report, some students noted that the SE team‘s timeline was missing dates: ―The biggest 
problem is that there are no dates at all on the timeline,‖ they wrote. ―The team has not 
worked out starting times, durations, and, most importantly, deadlines.‖ The technical 
communication students recognized that the timeline was probably written in a rote 
manner merely to fill a requirement of the course, with no apparent realization by the SE 
team that it had a purpose, or an audience that would really use it. In our terms, the 
technical communication students recognized the SE team as novices, using a 
―degenerate‖ techné (if that). Further, the technical communication students 
demonstrated their more advanced skills by producing a revised timeline with dates and 
deadlines, and laying out who on the SE team should have been responsible for which 
tasks.  
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Acting/Phronesis 
Their discussions and analysis also explored how the inadequacy of the communicative 
efforts on the part of the SE team contributed to the action (more usually inaction) of 
those involved in the Seabase project and, eventually, to its outcome. Going beyond just 
an analysis of the communication-related causes that contributed to the failure of the 
Seabase project, the technical communication students the technical communication 
students modeled behaviors in an attempt to advance the knowledge of future SE 
students. One example of this is the recommendation reports they wrote for the SE 
students that were crafted to help the next generation of SE Senior Design classes avoid 
the pitfalls the Seabase project encountered when making their controller.. They became 
teachers, an ability Aristotle considers a sign of knowledge (Meta 981b 8). Taking the 
point further, Aristotle describes this acting for the human good as the realm of phronesis 
(NE 1140b20). To reiterate Dreyfus‘ claim, by demonstrating virtuous behavior the SE 
students could then imitate, a portion of the SE world has been transformed. As T. Miller 
(1991) hoped, our technical communication offerings have ―ceased being a technical 
skills course and instead become 'practical,' in the most valuable sense of that word‖ (p. 
71). 
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Chapter Four: Methods Background 
Beverly Moss (1992) describes ethnography as ―a qualitative research method that allows 
a researcher to gain a comprehensive view of the social interactions, behaviors, and 
beliefs of a community or social group‖ (p. 155). However, this project should not be 
mistaken for a classic ethnography. Our goal was to create case studies that contained the 
richest descriptions possible, not to explicate a culture. We could not perform the years of 
fieldwork required of such endeavors due to limited resources, both financial and 
chronological. Nor did we try to record much beyond the development sessions proper, 
the exit interviews with the student participants, and some extended reflections on the 
data to help insure the veracity of the interpretations. We did follow standard and proven 
ethnographic techniques when writing it up (in our project, creating the cases) to present 
the material in as real a manner as possible. 
 
Initially this chapter provides a brief historical overview of those qualitative methods 
typically used in ethnographic investigations to provide background for a reader not 
familiar with the subject area. I then review some of the procedural and ethical issues 
inherent when undertaking any fieldwork, integrating and briefly explicating specific 
issues that arose in the planning and execution of our investigation. I then look more 
closely at the question of the ethical practice of qualitative research as it has been defined 
by Institutional Review Boards, and provide examples of my experience with the one that 
approved our project at Michigan Technological University. Following that I review the 
method of analysis I chose to use, Grounded theory, and the results obtained. Finally, I 
discuss the methods of presenting the data obtained, and provide rationales for the 
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choices of those methods. These sections remain largely theoretical, discussing as they do 
the larger issues involved when doing qualitative research. Later I will examine how 
those issues were applied and adapted to our specific project and defend the choices 
made. 
 
History 
Clair (2003) begins a history of qualitative methods with Herodotus‘ History, written in 
the 5
th
 century B.C.E. Pomeroy, et al. (1999) tell us that Herodotus ―interrogated 
informants of his parents‘ generation‖ to write the story of the Persian wars and ―discover 
what history revealed about human nature and the way the world works‖ (260). We 
equally could credit his contemporary Thucydides‘ History of the Peloponnesian War 
with that honor. 
 
Van Maanen (1988) divides qualitative research into anthropological and sociological. 
Initially, there was the ―armchair mode‖ of anthropology—researchers who did not even 
leave home, but relied on the journals and letters of explorers, traders, and tourists (15). 
Later, anthropologists were known to spend a long time in the field, studying cultures 
which were ―exotic‖ (14)—at least to them. Some of these were ―verandah 
anthropologists,‖ so called because once in the exotic locale they rarely left their porch, 
letting the culture come to them. 
    
Van Maanen further reports that the sociological branch began in the late nineteenth 
century in Britain, and was implemented as ―urban ethnography‖ in the 1920s by the 
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Chicago School (16). Rather than traveling to foreign climes, they tried to gather and 
report on what people (often the poor) were up to in the cities of America.  
 
This early work—especially in anthropology—was, as Clair points out, concerned with 
saving a picture of the culture, not the culture itself (8). As Clifford and Marcus (1986)  
put it ―the main motif that ethnography as a science developed was that of salvaging 
cultural diversity. The ethnographer would capture in writing the authenticity of the 
changing cultures, so they could be entered into the record‖ (24). 
 
This capturing was done by observing the culture under study. For Agar (1996), ―we‖ 
observed ―them‖ and then wrote an authoritative book that described what we saw, 
confident in the positivistic belief that it corresponded to reality: ―our notion of ‗social‘ or 
‗cultural‘ or ‗human‘ research grew out of the Western tradition of ‗scientific‘ research‖ 
(2). But while that may work for describing a piece of steel or a chemical reaction, 
understanding people, what they do and why they do it, is a little more complex. 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), as qualitative methods moved into the 1980s 
the author was no longer ―the authority‖; ―the observer has no privileged voice…the 
central task of theory is to make sense out of a local situation‖ (17). We have abandoned 
the concept of the aloof, detached observer in favor of Agar‘s ―participant observer‖ (20). 
That method emphasizes participation over observation as the means of coming to grip 
with the practices of everyday life (9). 
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A crisis of representation arose in the mid-1980s. As Denzin and Lincoln tell it: we 
cannot capture lived experience itself (19), we can only tell a story that represents what 
we as people involved in that experience make of it. The move away from a positivist 
certainty that there is a describable truth ―out there‖ is captured nicely by this story told 
by Clifford 
Ethnographers are more and more like the Cree hunter who came to Montreal to 
testify in court. But when administered the oath he hesitated: ―I‘m not sure I can 
tell the truth…I can only tell what I know‖ (8).  
 
In summary, our intention in pursuing and presenting this research was to gather material 
from a local culture, albeit one foreign to those of us from the Humanities Department, 
with the goal of the eventual edification of future Software Engineering students. We 
therefore make no claims of capturing the authentic of an entire culture, only of re-
presenting one part of it as faithfully as we possibly could. To this end we were 
participant observers and, while trying to minimize any ―guiding‖ of the participants 
towards our ends, were hardly aloof or detached. We also insured—again as much as 
possible—that the stories were those of the participants by seeking their input as to their 
veracity as collecting data portion of the research came to a close in the form of exit 
interviews, as well as after the case studies were written up. 
Fieldwork Methods 
Silverman (2005b) describes ―what you can (and can‘t) do with qualitative research‖. 
Noting that no one method fits all projects, he advises choosing ―a method that is 
appropriate for what you are trying to find out‖ (6). Likewise, Lauer and Ashford (1988) 
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provide eight designs that range from quantitative to qualitative. Their goal is to help 
readers ―discriminate among types of research…and to select designs appropriate for 
their own situations‖ (3). More to the point is Creswell (1994), who suggests that for 
some questions a ―mixed methods‖ approach is useful in that it incorporates a means of 
triangulation (15).  With those aims in mind, the Speaking of Software project was 
established to incorporate multiple method to avoid falling into what Silverman calls 
―simple inductivism‖ (78), that ―just being there‖ would be enough. This was to further 
ensure the reliability of the data we gathered (and the analysis of it), and also to provide a 
range of evidence to support the robustness of our interpretations. The methods employed 
included participant observation, where the researcher observed and recorded the team as 
they worked, data mining on the documentation they produced, and short exit interviews 
with the participants. The analysis was based on Straus and Corbin‘s grounded theory 
method, and the write-up emulates what Van Maanen refers to as a realist tale, brought 
up to date and presented in an electronic format. 
 
There is a difference in outlook among those who value qualitative and quantitative work. 
For Silverman (2005a), qualitative provides detail and quantitative can ―identify 
variance‖ (8)—presumably in search of validity to back up your work to positivists. For 
Lauer and Ashford (1988) qualitative (which they frame as ―rhetorical‖) provides the 
grist for the quantitative mill (6). They all agree that, as Silverman puts it, ―if resources 
allow‖ (8) an approach that combines methods can be advantageous. It is in that context 
of ―if resources allow‖ that I will later consider the Speaking of Software research 
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project, and argue that despite those limitations the mixed method approach chosen 
returned solid, robust information.  
 
For Giddens, writing in Central Problems in Social Theory (1979), resources are ―the 
‗base‘ or ‗vehicles‘ of power‖ which make up the ―structures of domination‖ within 
which we operate, and which we reproduce (69). One of those resources, in his words a 
―more historically significant‖ one than even Marx thought, is time (210). Although as 
Van Maanen (1988) tells us in Tales of the Field ethnography is usually ―extensive 
fieldwork in exotic cultures‖ (13), it is also possible to compress that experience into a 
shorter period. While spending only a limited time in the field runs the risk of reducing 
the breadth of the information obtained, if the research has a specific goal, as did the 
Speaking of Software project, discovering a great depth of depth of information is 
possible. In addition, a shorter period of investigation can help keep costs down and keep 
the project within budget, and sometimes the time is limited by the nature of the project 
itself. Both these were concerns for this project. In the case of the former, we were 
limited by the albeit generous NSF grant, and in the latter by the fourteen week semester. 
In contrast to the myth of the ―lone ethnographer‖ as related by Denzin and Lincoln—
Malinowski off with his islanders (15)—our project included the necessities of group 
work, both on the part of the subjects and the researchers.   
 
Early in any project it is necessary to reflect on and make explicit the researcher‘s 
backgrounds and motivations, in order to make clear the agendas of all involved and the 
possible bias and personal interest we brought to this project. As Agar (1995) suggests, it 
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is not whether we are biased—we are—but how those biases affect our work and how we 
document them (92). Our background is ―the initial framework against which similarities 
and differences in the studied group are assessed‖ (93).  In addition, this helps avoid the 
danger of the researcher guiding the respondent rather than getting a ―free‖ response to 
the questions (Schaeffer & Maynard (2002, 582); and provides transparency and thereby 
increases the credibility of our work (Rubin & Rubin (1995, 85).  
 
Participant Observation—Introduction to Fieldnotes 
Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw‘s (1995) classic Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes provided our 
ethnographers, some entering the field for the first time, a framework to use between 
observation/participation and authorship. In it, they situate their specific method(s) for 
fieldnotes within their larger ethnographic method of participant observation. While not 
dismissing other more passive or detached methods, the authors clearly feel that 
immersion is the preferred route to understanding those under study (2). That said, they 
note that in such circumstances one cannot be a ―fly on the wall‖ (3), and should not try 
to be. Rather one should appreciate the deeper understanding possible through 
participation and revel in it, while at the same time being conscious of, accepting, and 
reporting the risks and benefits of this method on the culture under study, the 
ethnographer herself, and ultimately the written report and its audience.  
 
The inseparability of method and findings is particularly important to understand when 
doing ethnography at a research institution such as Michigan Technological University. 
Emerson, Fretz and Shaw make it explicit: ―what the ethnographer finds out is inherently 
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connected with how she finds it out‖ (11). They also note the implications of that process 
to the accurate depiction of indigenous meaning: ―what it means to them‖ (12). For the 
Speaking of Software project, the indigenous meanings are twofold. First, there were 
those of the client, i.e., the meanings found in the language and practices of mechanical 
engineering. Second, there were the meanings held by the Software Engineering students. 
Often these were in conflict. As C. Miller (1979) wrote ―scientists, engineers, teachers of 
technical writing and their students tacitly share the positivist theory about the role of 
rhetoric in science. Consequently, students look upon writing as a superfluous, 
bothersome, and usually irrelevant aspect of their technical work‖ (615). As our goal was 
to create case studies that would appeal to and resonate with students in these fields, the 
constructivist outlook of Emerson, Fretz and Shaw allows appreciation of what the event, 
story, and interaction means in the culture under study as it is recorded, and facilitates 
accurate attempts to translate it to another audience.  
 
Their suggestion is to immediately record the fine details of the culture (14), to allow for 
later recall, reconstruction, and analysis. The researcher is to be open and flexible (26), 
and mold notetaking to the situation when possible. In an effort to be unobtrusive as 
possible, the authors recommend strategies to first maximize the content of these jottings 
when writing, and second to act as mnemonic devices when writing them up later. 
Specifically, students should jot down initial impressions of the scene–sights, sounds, 
smells, and so forth (26), then focus on ―key events or incidents‖, along with the reaction 
to them–their own and that of the members (27). Finally, they should look for variations 
and exceptions (29), and record them as well.  
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As we moved from these jottings (which were hastily written down while observing) to 
creating full fieldnotes, we consciously set aside the time to do so (immediately whenever 
possible) (40). We also emphasized the importance of balancing full description with 
capturing essential detail (47), and organized the fieldnotes in order to improve recall at 
later dates, using chronology, ranking by apparent importance, and topic areas (48).  
Emerson, et al. recommend creating ―fieldnote tales‖ as an intermediary step between 
jottings and further analysis. This process combines episodes which recount action and 
move in time into loosely constructed scenes, which help order thinking and 
understanding (89-91). They recommend using asides (brief reflections and reactions that 
clarify or interpret something just noted), commentaries (longer comments to an 
imaginary audience) and in-process memos (methodological questions, connections seen 
among other notes, potential areas to explore (101-3) to expand and illuminate the 
jottings done in the field, and begin the process of coding (for which they follow 
grounded theory methods).  
 
These strategies helped make the case studies ―come to life‖ by including concrete details 
that create a rich visual, oral, and tactile image that captures the ambiance of the situation 
(69) by including impressions of all senses whenever possible. We described the 
characters using verbatim quotes and rich depictions of their actions to give that ―you are 
there‖ sense (76), but avoided tagging them with stereotypes or evaluative comments that 
may have constrained us later (71).  
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Short Exit Interviews 
To employ the concept of ―triangulation as a validity tool‖, as Hesse-Biber and Leavy  
(2005a) recommend in ―Validity in Qualitative Research‖, the Speaking of Software 
researchers performed short exit interviews to expand and support our findings and ―earn 
the confidence of the reader that she or he have ―gotten it right‘‖ (66). In this case, given 
both the scholarly and the practical ends of this project, this became no mere academic 
exercise, but a real-world adventure in social interventionism as we provided a 
metacognitive view of the project and the social interactions that occurred during it, and 
some (early) analysis of the efficacy of those interactions. This was done as a way of 
―repaying‖ the students for their participation in the project; to help them, as well as 
helping future students that would use the cases. 
 
These interviews used a mix of fifteen open- and closed-end questions, and some prompts 
should they prove necessary. The questions were grouped into four categories, to elicit 
the interviewee‘s opinions on details of the project, their evaluation of the teamwork, 
information about interactions with the client, and their view of the end user of the 
product. (See Appendix 1.) Following the advice given by Pfeiffer (2006) in Technical 
Writing: A Practical Approach (an undergraduate textbook) most of the questions were 
objective to make it easy for the respondents to answer them, and to allow convenient 
data reduction (422), all without pushing a particular point of view (423). 
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Due to the short, one-shot nature of the interviews, worries about the researcher biasing 
the answers was minimal. Additionally, we arranged for the interviewer to be a 
researcher other than the one who had observed the team. In order to maintain some 
structure across the interviews we wrote out the questions, asked them exactly as written 
(Fowler and Mangione 1990 p. 35, in Schaeffer and Maynard (2002), digitally recorded 
the answers, then transcribed everything as completely as possible. By doing this, we had 
a permanent record of the questions as they were asked, and the responses as they were 
received.  
 
However, recording the interview brought its own set of concerns. While the use of a 
digital recorder may cause a loss of spontaneity, the effect, if present at all, was very 
short-term. It was also less intrusive than extensive note-taking, and allowed the 
interviewer to focus on the interview questions (and follow-up questions) instead of 
trying to write everything down. Instead, the notes act as a reminder of interesting 
responses, body language, interruptions, setting, and other details the tape might not 
capture. 
 
Transcribing the interview made it easier to compare responses of multiple interviews, or 
individual answers in a long interview. This was especially true as we were interviewing 
four people from each project (three students and the client), and sought consistency 
across the interviews. Obviously the recording did not insure consistency. Rather, it 
allowed us to check for it during analysis. 
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Consent—Institutional Review Boards 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) occupy an unenviable position at research 
institutions. Created initially to protect the subjects of study from undue harm at the 
hands of the researchers, they must now also draft procedures that protect the institution 
from potential lawsuits arising from the effects of misguided research. Due to this new 
role, IRBs are often seen as excessively bureaucratic, if not outright obstructionist, by 
researchers. This section will lay out the history and concerns that led to the creation of 
IRBs, and provide a ―road map‖ for dealing with them successfully. 
 
As we began this project we were aware of two major issues in dealing the subject of 
―consent‖. The first, posed as a rhetorical question, is ethical: why do we need to ask our 
respondents for permission to use their lives? The second is more pragmatic: how do we 
resolve the first with the requirements of an Institutional Review Board—without ruining 
our research? 
 
In the early days of ethnographic research, the first issue, asking for permission from the 
respondents, never came up. As Clair points out, the ―salvage efforts‖ of Boas, Sapir, and 
Mead were not aimed at helping the culture under examination, but at providing a data 
base for the Western anthropological community (6). With the linguistic turn, and its 
―emphasis on language to create culture, as well as to understand culture‖ (13), 
researchers began to reconsider the position of the respondent as a co-author, rather than 
an object of study. Goodall (2000) notes these changes in the ―ethical conscience‖ with 
the coming of the ―postmodern era‖ (153). For him, the question is: ―who owns the rights 
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to this story?‖ It is a choice between two rights; and there is no one best answer. The 
important point is that the question is considered, weighed, and that as researchers we 
find an answer all—participants and researchers alike—can live with (159).  
 
Given that  our postmodern sensibilities demand a more cooperative effort between 
researcher and respondent, we must address the question of when we should inform our 
subjects that we were researchers, and how much to tell them of our purpose? 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), coming from a scientistic stance, say before 
beginning; that is, at the first meeting with the participant. But doing that may foreclose 
entry, or the accuracy of what is discovered. Goodall‘s advice: ―it is absolutely essential 
that you [tell them]. Eventually‖ (his italics, 160). We chose to disclose our identities as 
researchers during the first meeting with the project teams, as well as providing a 
description of our goals, along with the informed consent paperwork.  
 
There seems little doubt that, as Warren (2002) points out, IRBs can ―constrain‖ the 
research project (88) in the ways Goodall suggests. Yet the goal of an IRB—protecting 
the participants from harm—is a valid one. No one, I think, would want a repeat of 
Milgram‘s ―Eichmann Phenomenon‖ experiments of the 1960s, yet the information 
gained is valuable; would the research have been as meaningful if the subjects had been 
informed that no one was actually receiving the shocks?  
 
Recently IRBs have sought to protect the institution from harm more than they do the 
participants, as Lincoln and Tierney (2004) argue. Although still tasked with ―assuring 
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compliance with federal law‖ that protects the participants (including confidentiality and 
anonymity), a main concern has become ―pressure from the political right‖ (220). This 
pressure tries to make qualitative researchers retreat to some more quantitatively-based 
model that, as Denzin and Lincoln (2005) argue, leave ―scholars…confronting the 
methodological backlash of ―Bush science‖ in its manifestation as the No Child Left 
Behind Act (20).   
 
The importance of these issues is not that these issues are resolved in some grand sense 
(for as we have seen, even someone with the experience of Goodall offers no 
―resolution‖) but in appreciating the dilemmas and dealing with them. Being sensitive to 
the rights of all involved is critical to all phases of research; data gathering, analysis and 
reporting alike.  
 
In my experience, a careful rhetorical analysis of Michigan Technological University‘s 
IRB website  opened the door to analysis of the rationale behind its rules. Looking at the 
information on the overall elements of informed consent on the Michigan Technological 
University IRB website I found the first item pertained to the voluntariness of the 
respondents (they use the term ―subject‖). Considering the list as a hierarchy this would 
indicate that voluntariness is of paramount importance. Continuing the analysis of the 
webpage I discovered the same entreaty repeated again under the heading ―Information‖. 
Here it stated that the respondents were to be informed that they were free to withdraw 
from the research at any time. This repetition strengthened my belief in the import of 
voluntariness. Reading on, I found three more instances referencing the voluntary nature 
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of participation in the section titled ―Information Required on Consent Forms‖. First it 
restated that participation is voluntary, and that the respondent may withdraw at any time, 
second was a rather oblique reference to the ―conditions of participation, if any‖ (italics 
mine), and finally that ―the subjects are at liberty to withdraw at any time without 
prejudice or penalty‖. These five mentions within two pages confirmed the priority of 
voluntariness, as no other term showed this amount of repetition as the Institutional 
Review Board explained its processes.  
 
With that in mind, on the consent form I created a heading titled ―Voluntary 
Participation‖. For clarity and emphasis I listed under that heading only two sentences: 
 
I understand I am free to decline to answer any questions at any time. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from this study at any time.  
 
Notice particularly that while in the second instance I reiterated the identical language 
used on the IRB website, in the first I expanded the protection beyond mere withdrawal 
to selective participation. I included this to make it clear to the participants that they had 
ultimate control of their situation. 
 
To end this example, I return to what seemed the second most important concern, which 
the respondent may not only withdraw, but that that withdrawal must not incur any 
―without prejudice or penalty‖. This I addressed on the consent form with the following 
under the heading ―Risks and Discomforts‖: 
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My participation (or lack of it) will have no effect on my grade. 
 
This statement was instantly noticed, and well appreciated by the students when they 
filled out the consent form. 
 
By  providing certain guarantees to the participants—freedom from harm by disclosing 
the purpose of the study, the right of confidentiality, the right to discontinue participation 
at any time, and an offer to provide them a copy of the results—I helped gain the 
necessary approval (number M0109) in a timely manner.  
 
Analysis—Grounded Theory Coding 
I chose grounded theory coding as a method of analysis for two primary reasons. Since 
our primary data was the recorded (and transcribed) interactions of the teams, and the 
teams with their respective clients, we had an accurate (or as accurate as recording and 
transcription allows) of the actual conversations. While we were able at later times to 
temper these with our observations, grounded theory coding provided the best potential 
for capturing the meanings of the participants, rather than our impressions of them. In the 
second place, one of the major goals of this project was to attempt to capture the real 
world interactions of the participants: students in entry level positions interacting with 
clients. Too many case studies present situations far removed from what graduating 
students are likely to encounter, and the grounded theory method allowed us to stay 
close—and true—to the actual interactions by preserving their original language. 
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However, the ultimate goal of grounded theory is theory building; for the Speaking of 
Software project itself that was not our goal. Rather, our short term goal was merely to 
present a descriptive story, and identify some themes that can be presented to future 
students to aid their inquiry into ―what is going on‖ in the various situations. That is, our 
aim was to provide cases for undergraduate students to study, discuss, and from which 
they can draw their own conclusions (construct their own theories) (145).  
 
Strauss  and Corbin (1998) present their grounded theory method (a refinement of earlier 
work by Glaser in 1978, and Glaser and Strauss in 1967) as a way to make sense of data 
and interpret it theoretically while staying close to the data. It allows the researcher to 
strive for reliability and validity while accounting for bias (x).  In their objectivist stance 
the method features a strong stress on the means of analysis (8) which provides some 
standardization and rigor to qualitative research (13).  
 
Grounded theory generally admits no pre-conceived ideas to the analysis of the data. That 
is, the analysis should always start from scratch. It derives theory from the data, which is 
―systematically gathered and analyzed; data collection, analysis, and eventually theory 
stand in close relationship to one another (12). Although a somewhat idealistic aim, their 
method seems a good fit for beginning ethnographers (as they claim), especially those 
coming from a scientific/engineering background. It is a way to get started in qualitative 
analysis by applying a pre-given set of tools.  
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Strauss and Corbin define three modes of the process: description—words chosen to 
convey a mental image (like metaphors); conceptual ordering—organizing data according 
to properties and dimension; and theory—well-developed concepts related to each other; 
a framework to explain or predict (15).   
 
Their method of coding starts with ―microanalysis‖, a detailed, line-by-line (or word-by-
word) ―deconstruction‖ of the data (descriptions found in the transcript) to generate initial 
categories (researcher supplied descriptions) (57). This focuses the researcher on inherent 
meaning, and on details. It teaches the researcher to recognize ―how much is packed into 
small bits of data‖ (65). It is here that the method is perhaps most useful to the beginner; 
and potentially moves him or her away from a merely ―surface‖ read of the data. (An 
experienced researcher might scan the transcript for interesting bits (70)).  
 
The next stage of their method (although in practice all stages are concurrent) they call 
open coding. The aim is to identify concepts that will later be used to develop theory.  
Starting with phenomena—central ideas of ―what is going on here‖—they are labeled as 
concepts using terms that are often taken from the words of the respondents themselves 
(in vivo codes) (105). These are then grouped into categories with explanatory and 
predictive potential (113). In my work with the Speaking of Software project, one 
category we identified was labeled ―access‖ and referred to the students difficulties in 
working with the departmental computers. One property or characteristic of access was 
the interactions with the system administrator, and this varied along the dimension of 
how accommodating he was in the given instance. Examining this category over time, 
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and looking at in comparison with the category ―progress‖ (axial coding)  we begin to see 
a certain explanatory power—why the project occasionally fell behind schedule and a 
certain predictive power as well—that a future interaction would likely follow the pattern 
of the past if no remediation was attempted.   
 
We followed the same project for two semesters and, in terms of the first semester, 
reached theoretical saturation (143). The data from the second semester suggested some 
new areas of inquiry, and those areas are different from those uncovered in the first. With 
that in mind, we moved to selective coding—integrating and refining the theory (143). 
We looked for what might be the central category, and tried to relate all the others to it 
(147).  
 
Charmaz (2002) proposes that contrary to the objectivist stance of Corbin and Strauss 
(and Glazer before them) where ―the meaning inheres in the data and the grounded 
theorist discovers it,‖ a constructivist approach ―sees both the data and analysis as created 
form shared experiences‖ of the researcher and the participants (677). The method 
provides some tools, but it does not guarantee knowing.  
 
She suggests that during coding, the constructivist approach ―encourages the researcher 
to be reflexive‖ about his or her preconceptions (683). In coding the data from the 
Speaking of Software project, one interest I brought in is defined by the goal of the grant, 
namely to inquire into the conversational interactions of the participants with the aim of 
enlightening future students on how things might work in the real world, and provide 
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some tools to empower them when they face similar situations. Exposing the 
undergraduates to the difficulties of communication in the workplace, and having them 
respond through analysis and recommendation, our case studies ―promote actions that 
eliminate problems, by studying oppressed and/or powerless populations and giving them 
voice‖ (35). This is critical interventionist research as Rubin and Rubin (citing Thomas, 
1995) describe it. In that sense our project can also be considered what Charmaz (2005)  
calls ―social justice research‖ in that we are committed to changing practices (512).  
 
Access, the category discussed above, demonstrates the viability of Charmaz‘ social 
justice emphasis. As described, the question of who controls the resource is an important 
one, and one that was never resolved (513). This dilemma shows an ongoing interplay 
between categories, with ―leadership‖, ―task division‖, ―negotiation‖, and ―progress‖ all 
playing roles.  In a post-project interview with one participant, he agreed with my 
analysis. He had been on an internship, and also seconded the ―irresolvability‖ of the 
dilemma, due to the conflicting yet very valid needs of the parties involved.  
 
Further, to insure reliability and avoid bias, she suggests asking a colleague or participant 
to code the data and compare the results (519). I trained Jon (the undergraduate assistant 
on the project) to do this. I allowed him to view my codebook, and initially he was in 
agreement with the descriptions I provided. He went back and reviewed the data itself to 
look for further examples, and developed additional categories as he saw fit and, most 
importantly, found negative examples in his fieldnotes that were not obvious in the 
transcripts I was examining.  
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While, as Coffey and Atkinson (1996) point out, even ―Glaser (1992) accuses Strauss of 
[making]…grounded theory into [an] unduly prescriptive recipe for analysis‖ (48). Their 
contention that it avoids a summary approach where the data are just reduced to 
categories (49) is especially useful in training new researchers who, (at Michigan 
Technological University at least) are prone to do just that. In addition, a grounded theory 
approach, in my opinion, encourages reflection on—and more importantly documentation 
in the form of memos—their reasons for making the choices they did. As a somewhat 
seasoned researcher, this kind of information is crucial to evaluating the newer 
researcher‘s progress in learning qualitative methods, and in assisting their efforts to do 
so. 
 
Writing It Up 
Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995) provide illustrative examples of how to turn fieldnotes 
into a finished ethnography. As stated earlier, our goal was to construct case studies, not 
full ethnographies. With that said, it is important to remember that one of our primary 
goals was to capture, and eventually present, those cases in as rich and realistic manner as 
possible. To achieve that goal, we drew heavily on the methods for creating 
ethnographies, to maintain that ―you are there‖ feeling.  
 
Emerson et al. suggest the use of excerpts (thematic to begin with, then ―evocative and 
persuasive‖ statements and situations added in as necessary (175)) to develop a story line, 
and a commentary to link them together (174). They compare the differences between 
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―integrative‖ style, where the excerpts are included in the story, and the ―excerpt‖ style 
that typically uses block quotes, and leaves the vignettes somewhat separate from the text 
(179).  
  
Recommending the introduction as a way to orient the audience to the text (and vice 
versa), the authors suggest including links to other scholarship (197). This serves to 
establish a theoretical frame for the ethnography (200). Also in the introduction the 
reader should find information regarding the setting of the ethnography (where, and with 
whom the fieldwork was done) (198), as well as a discussion of the specific method (how 
it was accomplished) (201). The conclusion, then, should summarize the ethnography and 
restate what was found; it should complete the world picture as outlined an the 
ethnography, and interpreted by the ethnographer, a ―metacommentary‖ (205).  
 
For the body of the report, they rely on the methods that Van Maanen presents in Tales of 
the Field. For Van Maanen, realist tales are ―by far the most prominent, familiar, 
prevalent, and recognized form of ethnographic writing [which] push most firmly for the 
authenticity of the cultural representations conveyed by the text‖ (45). This is the style 
used to present the Speaking of Software case studies. They typically follow four 
conventions. Experiential author(ity), where the author is absent and as an 
―impersonalized conduit‖ (47) presents only a descriptive narrative of what members 
―say, do, and presumably think‖ in the institutional voice of credentialed scholars (46). 
It‘s typical form is a ―documentary style focused on minute, but mundane details of 
everyday life‖ (48). Those details are not random, but accumulate to make some 
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important point (usually structural); they ―suggest intimacy and establish presence‖ and 
―draw in the audience‖ (49). It attempts to present the natives point of view as brought 
out by quotes (49), but must also include what they make of it (50). Still, the 
ethnographer has ―final word‖ on depiction (Malinowski style) (51). 
 
The discussion offered here falls somewhat into what Van Maanen calls confessional 
tales, as it is an attempt to ―unmask fieldwork‖ (91) and bring it into a more 
―philosophical, artistic, phenomenological, or political craft‖ (92).  Distinguished by its 
―highly personalized style and self-absorbed mandates‖ (73), it is a ―response to…realist 
conventions that have proved embarrassing‖ (74). Notice that it follows Van Maanen‘s 
three conventions, including a personalized author(ity) that speaks in terms of  ―I saw‖ 
instead of ―He did‖ (75), displays more of the fieldworker‘s qualities and point of view, 
and (hopefully) convinces readers it is real (79) by its very naturalness. 
  
Goodall (2000), in ―Ethics of Writing Ethnography‖ provides an interesting take on the 
question: ―who owns the rights to this story?‖ (6). Although there is a long discussion of 
plagiarism and citation format, the upshot seems to be to highlight that we credit other 
scholars, but not the ―other‖ we study (4). This brings out issues of authorship: Whose 
voice is it? Publishers/reviewers may not like collaborative (studier/studied) work; and 
then there is the problem of which voice gets picked from all you hear? When original 
comments were included (especially in the material from the second semester, where we 
made substantial use of recordings), we considered the risks to the subject, both in his 
community and in ours. There may be legal—not to mention physical—ramifications to 
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being an ―informant‖. We were aware of them in the field, made every attempt to conceal 
identities in the final case studies, always opting for the path of least harm (8). 
Methods Summary 
For the Speaking of Software project we wished to inquire into the communication 
practices of computer science students as they worked with clients on their Senior Design 
Projects, with the goal of improving the student/client communications. Unfortunately for 
the students we observed, they were not directly the beneficiaries of our work. Instead, 
we developed case studies to present to sophomores in the program; they would have the 
chance to better themselves. To this end, we adopted as much of a fly-on-the-wall, 
independent observer status as possible.  A secondary reason for this method was the end 
goal of the project, to see if we could produce the cases without an observer present by 
having the students record their interactions themselves. We also conducted ―exit 
interviews‖ with the students we followed, with the aim of gaining validity by presenting 
them with some findings and getting their opinions of them. This also served to provide 
some measure of critical intervention, as we ―enlightened‖ the students at that time to our 
interpretations of what we thought of the interactions (and how certain situations might 
have been handled differently) based on early analysis of the data, as well as our greater 
life experience. Some may argue that more intervention earlier in the project might have 
been better, but we were constrained by the established scope of the project, which was to 
let the students work things out for themselves. 
 
As an intermediary step we brought in an untrained undergraduate research assistant from 
the computer science department to do some of the observing. Initially, I advised him not 
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to become involved but just to record the meetings, using a digital recorder and taking 
split-page notes. Due to the objections of the client this proved unworkable, so we 
modified his position to more of a participant, while trying to minimize his contributions 
to areas concerning communication, and comment only on the software aspects. As the 
project progressed, I trained him on grounded theory coding, and had him do some of his 
own as well as check mine for accuracy.  
 
In the following chapter I will explain how I adapted the foregoing methods, and used 
them for our more pragmatic ends, providing a condensed ―road map‖ for anyone who 
might want to construct their own case study. 
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Chapter Five: Project Specific Methods 
In this chapter I turn from the more theoretical aspects of qualitative research, and detail 
the actual methods employed in developing the Seabase case study. The purpose here is 
to explain the reasoning behind the choices that were made, focusing on those that were 
necessary due to the time frame available. A second purpose of this chapter is to provide 
a succinct ―how-to‖ guide for those educators who may wish to develop their own case 
studies tailored for the requirements of their classrooms and institutions
2
. 
Developing the Case Studies: Applied Ethnography 
To develop our case studies, we applied proven ethnographic methods to capture and 
present views of real software development settings, making them available for future 
study. Using a qualitative case study approach we sought to focus particularly on the 
―important aspects or variables‖ of individuals working in small groups  (Lauer and 
Asher 1988). From those identifications, we developed case studies to be explored and 
analyzed by other students. Our goal was to simulate the workplace situations students 
will need to be able to cope with as they pursue careers in technical communication, 
computer science or other fields out in the real world. 
 
Collecting Data 
Any development process produces a massive amount of data, and the Seabase Project 
was no exception. The SE Senior Design students generated various versions of the code 
                                                 
2
 The material in this section includes previously published selections from ―Making and Acting: 
Ethnographic Development of a Case Study Approach. This first appeared in Technical Communication in  
2008 and was reprinted in Qualitative Research in Technical Communication in  2011 
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itself, along with meeting minutes, email, internal documentation and weekly progress 
and final summary reports for their clients. The SE students also reflected daily on their 
efforts and consolidated that information and their documented code into one-page 
progress reports submitted to the Senior Design instructor. Accessing this material was 
the first step of our case development. On the Senior Design Projects, ad hoc email lists 
were the method of choice for the project teams to communicate among themselves and 
with others. By the simple measure of being included on these lists, our research team of 
graduate students and faculty was able to view, and more importantly save, this original 
material.  The Senior Design instructor, client and SE students themselves provided 
additional material. 
 
Seabase, the first case study developed, was primarily archival in nature. Observing 
standard qualitative research practice (Lauer and Asher 1988; Kirsch and Sullivan 1992; 
Agar 1996) graduate students from the computer science department and the Rhetoric and 
Technical Communication program in the humanities department collected the written 
material from the Senior Design students and attended and recorded selected meetings. 
This case contains over one hundred pages of text, approximately one-half hour of audio 
excerpted from the meetings, and six video files. 
 
For subsequent cases, the graduate students were present at the majority of the students‘ 
meetings, including meetings with clients, acting as participant observers. The graduate 
students recorded the conversations with digital audio equipment, diagramed the rooms 
(including how people moved about and where they positioned themselves in relation to 
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both the room and each other), and wrote field notes. These field notes included fine 
details of the interactions that might not be apparent on the audio recordings to aid the 
researchers in their later recall, reconstruction, and analysis of the situations (Emerson et 
al. 1995) Further, the field notes attempted to capture and explain what the researcher 
thought of key events and incidents, and noted the non-verbal reactions of all 
participants.  Key events and incidents included major changes in the direction of the 
project, sometimes due to unexpected changes in the client‘s requirements, and 
sometimes due to factors outside the stakeholders‘ control. Incorporating these 
descriptions of the setting and details of the action (both visual and oral) captured the 
ambiance of the encounters and brought life to the cases, providing future users of the 
cases with that ―you are there‖ feeling.  
 
However, we felt it unnecessary to construct Emerson et al.‘s concept of full fieldnote 
tales. Instead, we adapted their concept. We arranged the raw fieldnotes into what we 
considered a chronological account before progressing to the write-up. This worked well 
because our data was already episodic in that the students often set their milestones by 
week, and we were compiling it in the same way, creating what would become self-
sufficient modules as we went. Additionally, many of our ―reflections, clarifications, 
expansions and illuminations‖ were done over the weekends, when the students typically 
did not meet, allowing for a timely recapitulation of the weeks activities. Also, our period 
of data gathering was relatively short term, covering only a little more than a fourteen 
week semester. Given the short time span and the already mentioned episodic nature of 
the data, we felt we had little need for the type of memory aid full fieldnote tales 
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represent. Even with that limited period of observation it seemed to us that we amassed a 
huge volume of data. Across the two semesters we followed the project, we collected 
over one thousand pages of notes and student-developed documentation, close to twenty-
five hours of audio recordings, and fourteen video files, some with animation. Of course, 
this could in no way be compared to the volume that accrues in a much longer project, 
where more rigorous recordkeeping and interim explanation/interpretation would be 
necessary as an aid to recollection when the study was finally written up. Finally, we 
were again constrained by the nature of the funding of the project, which limited the 
amount of time the graduate students could spend working on it. In other words, this was 
not a full-time job, even if it approached that status at times. 
 
These later cases tend to be richer than the first in that they make much more use of audio 
recordings. One in particular contains over five hours of audio excerpts, in addition to 
one hundred and forty eight pages of text and fourteen video files, some with animation. 
(Note that these figures represent primarily the contribution of the Senior Design teams. 
The amounts do not include the original code they were furnished, which itself totals 
more than one hundred and forty pages of single-spaced text.) 
 
As the projects wound down, the graduate students conducted semi-structured interviews 
with the Senior Design students and their clients. These interviews helped to triangulate 
results and interpretations, to support early findings and ―earn the confidence of the 
reader that the researchers have ‗gotten it right‘‖ (S.N. Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2005b). 
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We have on file signed and IRB approved informed consent forms from all participants 
covering the observations, interviews, and any subsequent use of the material collected. 
 
Constructing the Cases  
The first step to construct the case studies was to arrange the entire corpus of original 
material into a chronological summary account, including hyperlinks to the original 
documents. The graduate students then parsed it into modules, with each module 
covering (usually) one week of the semester.  To assist the students in identifying and 
examining the issues presented in the cases, we also prepared a set of questions for each 
module designed to provoke inquiry into the events. As an instructional aid, we 
developed some password-protected background material for the instructor giving an 
―insider view‖ of the situations, where the SE project teams were headed, and 
suggestions for classroom use.  
 
For ease of use by both instructors and students, we also created a thematic version. 
Rather than moving chronologically through the account, we identified some themes that 
allow the users to focus on certain aspects of the case, potentially reducing the time 
commitment considerably. The entire case is still available, but the themes provide pre-
selected entry points that can be followed independently of the case as a whole, if 
desired. 
  
These versions were prepared using the grounded theory method of Strauss and Corbin. 
Reading through the chronological account, the graduate students started with a detailed, 
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line-by-line analysis, moving between the chronological account and the descriptions 
available in the transcripts. This analysis generated initial categories, focused around 
inherent meaning and details, and identified central issues. These were labeled as 
emergent themes, using the original terms used by the students whenever possible.  
 
For example, one theme was related to the difficulty the Senior Design team working on 
the Seabase Project experienced when required to learn and work with an unfamiliar 
engineering-specific programming language, Matlab. The various occasions when the 
students had problems were then abstracted from the case and listed separately in 
chronological order, using the heading ―MATLAB‖. Other problem areas were also 
identified and grouped under their own thematic headings. 
 
By looking across themes, and comparing the content of interactions and when they 
occurred, an analysis can begin to demonstrate some explanatory and predictive power. 
For example, on occasion questions that arose in the MATLAB theme (when the students 
were working on their own) were not satisfactorily answered in the ―client interactions‖ 
theme (when they received no clear direction from the client, who was quite familiar with 
the Matlab program). This frustrated the SE students and impeded their progress on the 
project. These observations help explain why the project could not stay on schedule. This 
method of comparing across themes also provides some predictive power. It is likely that 
any future interactions between the students and their client would be a repetition of those 
of the past if no new approaches were tried. 
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Another category arose during grounded theory coding also relates to the frustration of 
the SE students in an unexpected way. This category concerned occasions when the 
students were stymied in their effort to produce something, a power point presentation in 
one instance, for example. When this occurred, the SE team lost not only the ability to 
produce, but the capacity as well.  That is, not only did they fail to produce the 
presentation (in that example), but they lost the capacity to deal with the situation. Instead 
of dealing with the problem, perhaps by planning a new approach, their reaction more 
likely was to throw up their hands in defeat and put off further action. This category did 
not make it into the cases as presented, as it was too far removed from our central goal of 
looking at communication practices. However, it does support my overarching contention 
that the value of making (poiesis) is often overlooked as a necessary element of 
production. That being said, I will offer an extended discussion of this category in my 
poietical conclusion. 
 
Presenting the Cases 
We chose to present our cases in the ―realist tale‖ style because this is ―by far the most 
prominent, familiar, prevalent, and recognized form of ethnographic writing‖ (Van 
Maanen 1988). Those familiar with documentaries will recognize how this style can 
expose the mundane, but nonetheless important, details of a situation. Like any 
documentary, these details gather to make a point about life. Beyond that, the details can 
inspire a sense of intimacy in the user; they feel they are in the presence of the 
participants, a part of the action, involved. To this end we use quotations, recordings, and 
the student‘s own documentation and reflections to authentically represent the 
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participants‘ point of view. We consulted with the participants for input on the accuracy 
of those representations to insure we remained true to their impressions of the process of 
dealing with stakeholders, tempered by our analysis and pedagogical goals.  
 
Bowing to the exigencies of the modern world and modern student, we have moved 
beyond the typical, paper-based presentation. Our case studies combine text, audio and 
video material into multimedia packages, where students in a Software Engineering or 
Technical Communication course can read text, hear audio clips or watch animations. 
The ―Seabase‖ case, for example, is comprised of 14 modules, each of which correspond 
to roughly one week of the semester. Each module contains a narrative detailing what 
happened that week in which links to original documents that the team produced and to 
audio files are embedded. By embedding hypertext links to the original documents and 
recordings rather than including them in an unwieldy appendix, this electronic format 
enhances usability, accessibility and portability. In addition, it adds to the reality of the 
case. For example, excerpts from an email might be included in the module, but the 
document that came with it as an attachment is left as a separate file. To access the 
information the student must open that attachment, as did participants with the original 
email. Requiring this action expands the reader‘s role from passive observer to active 
participant, raising interest in the case by making it seem more real. 
 
Our cases preserve the plain language used by the students and retain specific references 
to people, programs and equipment. Using the vocabulary of the application domain 
(mechanical engineering, in this instance) imparts contextual information with which the 
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SE students struggled, but that subsequent users might find insignificant. Encouraging 
this kind of constructive questioning of even something usually seen as transparent and 
mundane, such as language, elicits important details that might be otherwise missed 
(Sutcliffe 2003). 
 
To simulate the problems of dealing with the issues of real clients, we designed the 
presentation of the material so that information concerning project requirements is 
imparted in stages, much as often occurs in the real world (this presentation is described 
in more detail below). In some cases, we present examples of communication failure, 
helping students reflect on what went wrong and develop alternatives they might pursue 
to avoid these difficulties themselves (Gale 1993). 
 
Next, I will address the value and implications of using the case studies in a technical 
communication classroom, and how they can be used to teach phronetically.  
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Chapter Six: Pedagogy Conclusion 
In this chapter I conclude the discussion of pedagogical concerns. First I present a 
summary describing the value of the use of case studies in the classroom. I follow that by 
considering some of the implications of that use, and end with my recommendation for 
teaching phronetically. 
 
Value of Case Studies 
Instructors are frequently caught in a pedagogical bind. Similar to the practices of the 
early years of technical communication instruction, using a ―forms‖ approach—what I 
have equated to an impoverished techné—is relatively straightforward: craft the 
assignment to meet certain goals, have the students do it, and compare the result against 
those goals. But what is missing from this approach, as so many have recognized, is the 
rough and tumble, kairotic atmosphere of the workplace. That is where the phronetic 
approach comes into its own: working well with others is highly valued, creatively 
responding to the situation more important than blind adherence to rules. But as I have 
argued earlier, there are difficulties with directly teaching phronesis. In this section I 
discuss the strengths and limitations of some methods that have been used to bridge the 
divide between techné and phronesis, and argue for the value of a case study approach. 
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Spinuzzi (2004) and Blakeslee (2001) have both written about workplace collaborations, 
or client-based projects. For Spinuzzi the importance is to share and reflect on the 
experience in the classroom. Blakeslee finds that feedback is critical, but that the quality 
and usefulness of such feedback varies widely. Using the case study I developed, I 
provide examples of sometimes less-than-clear feedback in client-based projects. 
 
Unfortunately, there is often neither time for nor availability of real workplace positions 
that can accommodate all students. Even if we place them in internships or co-ops, often 
this occurs relatively late in their college experience. At that stage, they may find three or 
four years of work in their major did not adequately prepare them. They may become 
frustrated, disillusioned, or worse—discover that the career path they have been pursuing 
is not really ―for them‖. It is far better to expose the students to the ethical dilemmas and 
political realities they may face early; in an introductory course. It is there we must 
simulate that experience, for it is through experience that students learn.  Further, using 
the same source materials, I demonstrate the value of simulating the ambiguity and goal-
driven nature of the workplace, while at the same time recognizing the need to respond 
―teacherly‖ manner, and ask the students to make their learning explicit through memos 
and reports. 
 
Freedman, Adam and Smart (1994) have noted that students report that the simulations 
they find in many case studies are ―artificial.‖ I wholeheartedly agree with Thomas‘ 
(1995) opinion that some of that feeling may come from the unrealistic expectations we 
place on the students by asking them to play roles too far from their existing or imminent 
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experience. We can hold their interest and ease their transition to the workplace if we 
have them adopt ―entry level‖ roles as they work through the case studies. I have 
enlivened the case studies I developed by soliciting comments from the people using 
them, instructor and student alike. As an indicator of success, one reader of a case I 
developed for SE told me ―he couldn‘t put it down; it read like a novel‖. Incorporating 
literary techniques (such as those recommended by Aristotle in the Poetics)  improved 
the cases, which then improved their acceptance by the students. Providing 
overwhelming detail in a well-told story based on real experiences reduced artificiality, 
and allowed students to respond in a manner consistent with their existing expertise.  
 
Another option exists to simulate workplace experience: student-generated projects. Here 
we must also develop projects that are not superficial, and treat them like they matter. 
One way to do this is to let the students choose their own projects, ones that matter to 
them. It is more difficult than teaching from a ―canned‖ case, one where we know all the 
facts, and most of the ―right‖ answers in advance. The ambiguity involved (and, at times, 
the intentional ambiguity of our responses) can provide a taste of real world experience. 
The students wrestle with ethical issues at the same time as they develop a product.  
 
The cookbook approach works well enough to begin with, but at some point the students 
must be creative enough to supply their own solutions, and we as instructors must support 
those solutions (within the protected confines of the institution, at least). At other times, 
we must play the role of the boss, and point out deficiencies—cold-heartedly. For this is 
something they will encounter in the workplace too: pragmatism at its finest. The 
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instructor must become a technite of education. She must know when to support the 
students in phronetic manner by letting them make mistakes and learn from those 
experiences, and when to guide more explicitly in the manner of a master of the craft 
teaching an apprentice.  
 
Freedman (1993) asked ―is explicit teaching possible?‖ and answered that, except for 
certain individuals, in certain circumstances, it is not. Like Sullivan (2004), I think some 
explicit teaching is not only possible, but necessary; otherwise we commit the students to 
reinventing the wheel each time we enter a classroom. However, there needs to be a 
balance between teaching explicitly and learning through experience. In some cases it is 
better to front-load the knowledge, and then allow the students to use it, as we might 
explicitly deliver ―the rules‖ of production under a techné-based pedagogy. I have found 
this approach works well with straightforward assignments like progress reports. The 
students must report certain things—are they on schedule, what have they accomplished 
in the reporting period, what difficulties need to be resolved. In other situations, a style 
based on a phronetic approach is more successful: we wait for the students to ―discover‖ 
the proper course of action themselves through experience, and only later supply them 
with the knowledge to use. I am reminded of a scene from the movie ―The Eiger 
Sanction.‖ Clint Eastwood and Arthur Kennedy are climbing a sheer rock wall, with 
Eastwood in the lead. He turns back to Kennedy and asks ―is this the right way?‖ 
Kennedy responds ―Well, it‘s one way, I guess.‖ The point is that Eastwood must learn 
from his own experience, and the route he chooses may ultimately be better than the one 
Kennedy might know. 
139 
 
 
To say that something works for certain students in certain circumstances is not enough. 
We also need to find out what works, for who, and why if we want to advance our 
pedagogy. One way we discovered this was to ask the students themselves.  
 
Case studies can be developed based on the experiences of the students themselves. Too 
often, the canned cases used in the classroom are based on the experience of the 
instructor, often gained from his/her work in industry, or as a consultant. As valuable as 
these cases may be, the role of a consultant is not usually an entry-level one, nor is that of 
bank director or department head. Yet these are the scenarios into which the students are 
asked to place themselves, the roles they are asked to adopt. It seems to be better to 
develop the cases based on entry level work, the kind of challenges the students might 
face in the first job. We have had some success in generating cases based on the actual 
difficulties students face in their Senior Design Projects, which they have reported to be 
consistent with their real-world experience on internships. A further advantage is that the 
use of a Senior Design Project allows for exposure to the ethical dilemmas and workplace 
cultures they face, while following a production based project.  
 
In either situation we must our ask students to reflect, and bring their knowledge to 
discursive consciousness. We can do this within a grading rubric to judge their learning. 
But then, allowing them to revise the assignment and improve their grade inspires 
reflection on the shortcomings of the original. Bringing knowledge to discursive 
awareness through reflection reinforces the students learning as well: they become 
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technites, capable of teaching it to others. And when they can do that, they will have 
acquired the craft, the techné of what they do. And that craft will become, as Brady 
(2007) found,  their guide ―as they investigate knowledge that changes from one social 
context to another, one community to another, one practice to another‖ (16), a guide that 
will allow them to better cope with the workplace. 
 
Implications 
The examples provided of our experience using the Seabase case in a technical 
communication classroom show that the students have learned valuable lessons about 
communication and about working on interdisciplinary teams. One lesson concerns the 
importance of valuing the skills of others; that is, team members must come to appreciate  
other member‘s capacity to make. The technical communication students learned this the 
hard way when they saw their own skills were frequently underappreciated, reflecting an 
intra-team conflict Myers and Larson (2005) suggest is rooted in relations of power. In 
evaluating the situation, one technical communication student explained her frustration 
working on a multidisciplinary team analyzing the Seabase project. ―I did not like how 
my team functioned. Skills possessed by some were overlooked or not valued. The 
function of my team was to ‗please the instructor‘ and not to do a good job working on 
the assignment.‖ This kind of conflict between engineering and technical writing students 
is all too common, and possibly rooted in the positivistic attitudes carried over from the 
industrial revolution. But regardless of its roots, it remains something we should prepare 
our students to encounter. 
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Another valuable lesson exemplifies the possibility of the Isocratean ideal of learning to 
act well with others through imitation. In a case still under development, the Senior 
Design Project team needed root access to the departmental computers, something the 
system administrators were unwilling to grant. Though the situation was frustrating to his 
team, one member drew on his workplace experience in explaining the inherent 
difficulties of acting in the interests of ―the good‖ that are sometimes conflicting, 
depending on from which side of the situation the good is seen:  
 
―They want to keep the machines [computers] secure, and that‘s reasonable. That‘s 
actually what I do in my coop internship position, I‘m an information security 
intern, and we handle thousands of requests each month asking for access.‖  
 
He was able to appreciate the dilemma from both sides, and demonstrated an insightful 
understanding of the workplace, and the situation-bound nature of acting in it. He was 
also able to communicate that understanding not only to his team but, through the case 
study, to future students. The advantage of ethnographically developed case studies like 
ours is that they capture the realities of those situations, and present them to students as 
compelling examples of real dilemmas, simulations they can learn from through 
imitation, analysis and reflection. 
 
Like Brady (2007), we believe that these lessons are taken from the classroom and 
applied when students get ―on the job.‖ We believe this is facilitated by the reality of our 
cases, made possible through the method we used to develop them. By relying on the 
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tested procedures of ethnography, we have faithfully recorded and reported the real 
experiences of real students working with real clients. Students particularly appreciated 
the inclusion of the actual documents as created by the SE team, and the conversations 
that surrounded their creation. Too often, the material in case studies is reduced to a 
minimum, rendering it sterile and incomplete. By employing ethnographic methods, our 
cases overcome this problem. 
 
The students in our technical communication courses became aware of how 
documentation can contribute significantly to a project‘s success or failure. In the 
Seabase project, the inclusion of the actual emails, minutes, reports and so forth created 
by the SE team allowed the students to experience first-hand the repercussions of lacking 
both knowledge of and experience in applying principles of audience, purpose and 
context. 
 
The challenge of working with people from other disciplines is common. Management, 
designers, engineers, production, sales and technical communication personnel must be 
able to reach consensus if the goals of the company or client are to be achieved. 
Simulating the experience of real situations, and encouraging reflection on and discussion 
of those situations, helps prepare students majoring in technical communication for those 
challenges, and deepens the appreciation of the value of communication skills for those 
students who major in other fields. For a student graduating with a degree in scientific, 
professional, and/or technical communication, this experience is crucial as they join the 
workforce and become practitioners.  
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Recommendations 
As Brady (2007) points out in ―What We Teach and What They Use: Faculty Teaching 
and Students Learning in STC Programs and Beyond‖, ―students learn what we teach, 
both practically and theoretically…[they] take it with them to the workplace, apply it, and 
improve their understanding of it with repeated use‖ (1). This mirrors the Isocratean 
approach of Miller.  Brady‘s study of the composing strategies of eight students shows 
that what we do as instructors has lasting effects, that when we ―‗synthesize genre 
knowledge with social knowledge to create situated pedagogy‘ (Johnson, ―User 
Centered‖ 164) in our classrooms‖ (25) the students do, in fact, learn something. 
 
Teaching technical communications is often seen as an impoverished techné: pragmatic 
skills delivered through mentoring or apprenticeship. There is a need, as Blakeslee points 
out, to ―transmit knowledge and authority to beginners‖. But our production-based 
methods can allow us to at the same time achieve a purpose ―above and beyond the 
initiation of newcomers‖ that Freedman and Adam note, achieving the collaborative and 
humanistic goals Miller recommends. We do want to take Spinuzzi‘s advice and ―prepare 
minds so that they will be better able to cope in the workplace‖, yet at the same time 
follow the advice of Sullivan and Rutter and help our students avoid becoming slaves to 
it. With Blakeslee, we want to stimulate the creativity that can be deadened by a 
cookbook approach, yet recognize that not all students can enjoy the benefits of actual 
workplace collaboration. 
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Teaching phronetically, understood as facilitating the students learning through 
experience, has the potential to move us beyond an emphasis on a theoretical, facts-based 
approach, and beyond a skills/technique method that has been characterized as 
―cookbook‖ or an impoverished techné. Thinking of phronesis in this way suggests a way 
to if not resolve, at least sidestep the Aristotelian dilemma that phronesis can not be 
taught. Placing the burden of becoming phronemoi on the students differs little from 
current practice; we already understand that their learning is, in large measure, up to 
them.  
 
A further recommendation addresses the clients. I have seen first-hand the varieties of 
their approach, and suggest that we should be providing those who so generously 
volunteer to work with our students with some guidance; perhaps an instruction manual 
for being a client. While it is not necessary to make clients into teachers—indeed that 
would in some ways lessen their value as clients qua clients—as instructors we also carry 
the responsibility to see to it that our students receive the best experience possible. The 
difficulty in removing the ambiguity from our simulated workplace is balancing that 
action against the gains students might achieve with more explicit responses. 
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Chapter Seven: Poietical Conclusion 
Rutter (2004) has suggested that experience/phronesis is the ―ordering agent‖ in our 
lives. Aristotle suggests that politics is the master art (NE 1094a 28), with phronesis 
playing a ―controlling part‖ (NE 1141b 24). But Aristotle, like Arendt (1958) many years 
later, admits that physical needs must be fulfilled before we have time (and energy) for 
those loftier pursuits. These needs are filled by workers through their capability to 
produce, whether rich or impoverished.  
 
Techné then appears more likely to be the ordering agent, the one whose actions provides 
first for our physical needs, freeing us to contemplate and determine what might be 
considered the good life. Put differently, and perhaps somewhat harshly, modern 
interpretations have reduced techné, and its activity poiesis, to mere technology. This can 
be interpreted as elitist attempts to maintain power over the other; e.g. the owners and 
supervisors can reduce to mere assembly-line technique the work of those whose actions 
can be conveniently construed as having no end outside itself. A rich notion of techné 
must reject this impoverished view where production is only for the purpose of 
maintaining the lifestyles of certain segments of society at the expense of those who 
labor. A rich notion of techné must see the technite as attending to both the work at hand, 
as well as its eventual use in the world. John Wild (1941) is a primary source on Plato‘s 
concept of techné, which he positions as production. Importantly, he also defines techné 
as the art with the ability to ―give a rational account of itself, explaining why it does what 
it is doing‖ (256). Giddens (1979) terms this ability to explain as discursively available. 
Protagoras and Isocrates, as described by Sipiora (1995) and Atwill and Lauer (1995), 
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favored what was called logon techné, an approach more grounded in imitation and civic 
action than Plato‘s. Aristotle provides a description of both techné and phronesis in the 
Nicomachean Ethics that may be responsible for the split between the two (making is not 
doing, nor is doing making). I returned to the original sources to explore the roots of the 
split between techné and phronesis, a divide that continues to exist today. 
 
Over the years since Aristotle this distinction between these two ways of coming to truth 
has become a binary: either something is techné or it is phronesis (leaving aside for the 
moment the other three of the ways Aristotle says we can come to truth). Usually these 
commentators tend to favor one side of the binary over the other, just as I suggest 
Aristotle does. Authors frequently do this because they see one side as more 
representative of the way they see the world: it has more explanatory potential, it seems a 
better fit, or it is just more useful.  
 
 
I am no different: I tend to favor techné as a way of being-in-the-world over phronesis. 
My personal valorization of techné over phronesis arises in large part from my 
background. Prior to my entry into the academy—or perhaps more of a reentry after a 
twenty-five year absence—I worked as a mechanic and manager of various automotive 
repair facilities.  
 
I believe my experience reflects one of the most valuable parts of McCarthy and Wright‘s 
(2005) proposal—the importance of ―felt life.‖ As they put it: 
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―In order to do justice to the wide range of influences that technology has on our 
lives, we should try to interpret the relationship between people and technology in 
terms of the felt life and the felt or emotional quality of action and interaction‖ 
(12).  
 
Three pages later they state that ―it is difficult to develop an account of felt experience 
with technology.‖ I see injecting my experience as one way to fulfill the objectives 
McCarthy and Wright seek as they try to bring ―user experience‖ to the art of making, 
and to show important differences between Freeman‘s practical wisdom and mere 
knowledge. Applying Aristotle‘s dictum of ―Each man judges well the things he knows,‖ 
my intention is to search for the experiential in the experiential: to go ―to the thing itself‖ 
in real life—noting, as I say them, the inherent difficulties of both object and the ground 
of that search. 
 
To buttress my experience, and give some common ground, I draw on Douglass Harper‘s  
(1987) Working Knowledge. In it, he has presented in a relatively accurate ethnographic 
picture of Willie, a man with whom I share the trade of mechanic. Though Willie‘s 
situation is less formal than mine was, I believe Harper has caught the mix of techné and 
phronesis; of skill and experience that I seek to investigate. Drawing on Willie‘s 
experience and my own will, I believe, allows readers to first gain a deeper understanding 
of techné than can come from a strictly hermeneutic approach, and secondly to come to 
an appreciation of the tie it has to phronesis through the common element of experience. 
In addition experience, far from being absent in techné, is as crucial to techné as it is to 
phronesis, but usually undertheorized.  
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An Experiential Accounting 
This is the world I know, where the social is mediated partly by tools. I consider an auto 
repair shop a social order, or at least a community, and there are tools used with others 
and belonging to others, as Mitcham suggests. Learning the ethics surrounding those 
tools is part techné, and part phronesis.  
 
There are ―shop tools‖ with one set of responsibilities, and ―personal tools‖ with another. 
In both cases a new employee is taught the rules of use, ―teachable‖ implying techné. 
―Don‘t abuse them‖ is one rule, ―put them back when you are done‖ is another. In 
Harper‘s Working Knowledge the situation with the wheel puller exemplifies the techné 
involved ―This wheel puller is strong...but you have to hit it in the right place. If you hit it 
[wrong], a person can very easily mess this up‖. And Willie recognizes that Harper‘s wife 
has that techné: ―she has that knowledge—a king of mechanical knowledge that comes to 
her when she is doing things like that. An average person you don‘t hand a tool like that‖ 
(29). In my shop we had an ―average‖ person (a mechanic with years of experience), but 
he lacked that techné. The tool, a ball joint press, used the same principle as the wheel 
puller, a screw to exert pressure. You could hit it, but hit it wrong and the tool was 
ruined. This guy ruined three of them at last count; no techné there.  
 
Phronesis comes in with the care of the tool, and a view to the good of the shop. A 
phronomoi would tell the boss the tool was ruined, so it could be replaced. As it was, 
when another member of the community went to use the tool, he would find it unusable, 
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and the shop would suffer on many levels. This aspect goes beyond the mere technique, 
(which he apparently never learned); beyond the mere care of the tool to care for the 
community. This aspect is learned; I don‘t think it can be taught (though with this guy we 
tried). You learn it when you go to use the tool, it‘s broken, and you come to feel how the 
actions of another have affected you. This attitude, this ethic, can be seen, and Willie 
knows it when he sees it: ―Not everyone shares the use of the shop and the tools. If you 
are willing to learn, and Willie has sensed that you will handle the tools properly, you are 
invited to use them‖ (29).  
 
A different level of care surrounds the use of personal tools. Here, if the tool is damaged, 
the responsibility is to replace, not just report. This is what happened when Willie 
borrowed the backhoe. When it broke ―there was no question about fixing it—if you 
borrowed something and it broke while you had it, you fixed it whether it was your fault 
or not‖ (188). Violating this ethic has social consequences, ranging from the ―don‘t ask to 
borrow‖ signs posted on many toolboxes (and often supplied by Snap-On, a major tool 
manufacturer), to the ―decidedly aloof and distant‖ attitude Willie showed the owner of 
the backhoe, who didn‘t understand the ethic of ―borrowing‖. Willie acted phronetically, 
and ensured the good of the community by applying his techné and fixing the backhoe; 
the owner did not act within those bounds and was, for a time, excluded from the 
community. (It is this same exclusion that was felt by Freeman‘s interviewees, which 
they tried to ameliorate through simulating the experience of their parents.) When 
Mitcham reduces all to the logical and rational he, like the owner of the backhoe, is 
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missing an important part of the world: the experience that informs both techné and 
phronesis.  
 
Towards a Techné of Phronesis 
Like the ―felt experience‖ of Freeman‘s respondents, these simulations of experience can 
increase knowledge (episteme) along with practical wisdom. A picture of Omaha 
Beach—or even a movie—is not the same experience as standing there; and being there 
today is not the same experience as being there on June 6th, 1944. Each experience 
carries with it its own knowledge as well, admittedly with some overlap. Practical 
wisdom comes best through ―real‖ experience, as Samuel Taylor says: judgment is forced 
upon us by experience. But Taylor does not comment on the quality of judgment, and for 
Aristotle phronetic judgment can only be good. How then to resolve Will Rogers‘ more 
pragmatic ―good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that from bad judgment‖?  
 
Simulating experience then would seem to be more techné than phronesis, since techné 
can be deployed for either good (as it should be) or bad (in Aristotle‘s example, the 
teacher allows the pupil to follow a wrong course in order to better learn the right one). 
But we cannot always have real experience: sometimes it is too costly, too time-
consuming, or too dangerous. Do we want to allow bad techné when lives are at stake? 
Or is it better to simulate experience through techné, practice phronesis in the controlled 
environment of techné? The creation and use of case studies, like a present-day visit to 
the battlegrounds of war, is then a craft, a techné of phronesis. And the key to any viable 
techné of phronesis can be found in the action of techné, poiesis. 
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Heidegger (1953) reviews a poem by Hölderlin in an essay titled ―…Poetically Man 
Dwells…‖. His argument, in contradiction to Rutter ‘s claim that we live and act 
phronetically, is that we live (dwell) poetically, (but do not confuse this with the 
sometimes sappy greeting card rhymes, which can represent an impoverished sense of 
poetry). For Heidegger, the action of poetry is a making, in the Greek poiesis, that calls 
―that which in its very self-disclosure causes the appearance of that which conceals itself‖ 
(223). 
 
Poetry is the name we give to what is often considered the highest of language arts: that 
which evokes in the reader the experience of the author. Yet this may inadvertently 
impoverish a larger meaning when we reserve it so. Colloquially, we speak of the ―poetry 
in motion‖ of Michelle Kwan, Michael Phelps and, until recently, Tiger Woods; yet they 
are artists of the swing, the skate and the stroke, not poets of the word. As society moves 
toward the mundane, the vulgar understandings, first the importance of the poet is lost, 
then that of the artist. Eventually, the impoverished term technician describes the making 
that only supports life, but does not expand it. My aim has been to examine—and 
hopefully help to correct—this trend, and restore the poetical—as poietical—as the way 
we are in the world. A rich pedagogy based on poiesis, the joining and balancing of 
techné and phronesis, of making and doing, can accomplish this end. Following the 
prescriptions contained herein is one to approach that possibility. 
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Finally, let me return to my overarching argument, that it is the overlooked activity of 
techné, namely poiesis, which is the ordering agent in our lives. Here I differ with Dunne, 
Mitcham, McCarthy and Wright and the others. I agree with their appraisal that phronesis 
can be an ordering agent. However, where I differ is that it does not seem to me to be that 
it can be the primary agent. Aristotle himself claims that phronesis is not found in the 
young because they lack experience (NE 1142 13-17). This would lead to the conclusion 
that it is only as we age can our lives be ordered. I believe that while that may be accurate 
in the sphere of ―doing good in public‖, I cannot believe that it is true overall. Even in 
younger days our lives can be ordered. This is especially apparent within the concept of 
techné: what is the whole apprenticeship tradition if not a way to order a life? 
 
In both techné and phronesis, it is the activity which brings competence. Historically, for 
phronesis the two are inseparable—it is only through activity (experience) that we are 
understood to gain the competence of acting for the good. My argument for a techné of 
phronesis has suggested that that there is another way, through simulating experience. 
But that simulation is only a simulation as presented to the students. To begin the 
students on the path to phronesis the situation must be as real as possible, and that is the 
goal, and success, of our case studies. 
 
At the heart of both techné and phronesis then is activity. For techné it is the making 
(poiesis); for phronesis doing (praxis).  In the realm of phronesis this poses minimal 
difficulty except for those who wish to educate the youth, and that difficulty has been 
addressed earlier, and a provisional solution proposed. In the realm of techné, however, 
153 
 
the stakes are different. I have argued, as does Wild, for the possibility of a diminished or 
impoverished techné, where the activity includes no consideration of the public good. 
Also included in this definition would be the situation where the maker has the reasoned 
capacity to make, but not the ability. Two examples here might help. When I managed a 
service garage, I would occasionally hire a new mechanic fresh out of a 
vocational/technical school. He or she might have the theory, the reasoned capacity to 
make (the repair), but often lacked the hands-on ability that only comes with experience. 
I am another example, but with the chronology reversed. When I was young I could play 
the guitar. After years of being a mechanic, with extensive nerve damage to my hands, I 
no longer have the dexterity. I assume I still have the capacity, but no longer the ability. 
 
Moving away from the experiential, I offer another piece of support for my argument that 
it is activity and experience that lead us to ordering our lives, in whatever fashion that 
may be. In developing the case studies I used grounded theory somewhat 
unconventionally to develop the themes embodied in the cases. However, a more usual 
application of grounded theory contributes to my argument that action—poiesis—is the 
critical, yet overlooked element of techné. Simply put, the times when the members of 
the Software Engineering team were most dysfunctional were when they were unable to 
act. In these instances their capacity to act was limited by their inability to act. This may 
seem a conventional truism, that if you cannot perform a task you cannot perform a task. 
But reading this through the lens of grounded theory supports a more fine-grained 
interpretation of techné. As I argued earlier, many conceptions of techné are 
impoverished in that they omit one important element or another. Most commonly, the 
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undervalued element is the activity of the maker. This often stems from what I have 
argued are incomplete interpretations of the ancient texts which lead to the belief that it is 
only the telos, the end use of the thing made that has value. The undercurrents of this 
belief quite probably originate with the upper-class elitism brought about by the industrial 
revolution, when technology made mass production possible and, as Bourdieu argues, the 
spirit of the craftsman was embodied in the machine, thus devaluing both the maker and 
the thing made. Reestablishing the importance of the actual making in the process of 
production should be our goal. 
 
A few examples that rise from grounded theory analysis show the pervasive nature of this 
devaluing. Setting an alarm clock incorrectly prevented one member from attending an 
important organizational meeting, and resulted in not only hard feelings but no progress 
(no making). A lost flash drive resulted in no progress in another meeting as the data on it 
was needed, yet unavailable. (The drive was eventually found, and then progress was 
made.) A sick child got in the way of making progress in yet another meeting; the parent 
again had material that was needed to make the requisite charts. A car that would not 
start, the occasional illness, and responsibility to other classes all interrupted the activity 
of making, and endangered the project. Without activity, the ―capacity to‖ means little. 
But for the most part, these interruptions were passed off with a “well, these things 
happen” attitude. Even the participants were unaware of how they valued the capacity 
(―of course, I could have‖) over the activity itself (―but I couldn‘t/didn‘t because…so it‘s 
not my fault‖).  
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And without activity, the risk is that techné becomes diminished, if not non-existent. This 
is what the data from the two Seabase studies support. In the first iteration, the students 
were unable to overcome the lack of making, and the project eventually failed to make 
anything. In the second the following semester they were able to overcome, thanks 
largely to one very dedicated member, and were successful in making the controller 
software.  
 
In this dissertation I hope that my contribution, aside from constructing the cases 
themselves and providing a road map for others who might wish to do same, is to show 
that poiesis, the activity of making, is the overlooked term in consideration of techné, 
unlike the privileged place praxis, the activity of doing, occupies for phronesis. Further, 
that it is inclusion of making, in a real and valuable sense as opposed to what might be 
seen as ―busy work‖ by the students, which should be an imperative in our pedagogy. As 
Heidegger says, quoting Hölderlin, ―…poetically dwells man upon this earth‖.  
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Appendix 1-Speaking of Software Exit Interview 
Project____________________Date/Time________________Place_________________  
Interviewee___________________Interviewer_____________________ 
 
PRODUCT DETAILS: 
What product are you making?  
Tell me something about it.  
Can you tell me some specific details about it? 
What are the most important qualities that the product should have, from the client‘s 
point of view?   
Of the above qualities, which do you feel confident about being able to (or were able to) 
deliver? 
Are there any that you won‘t be able to deliver? 
What do you consider your resources for this project?  By resources, I mean people or 
information outside of your team that make your work easier or better? 
 
TEAMWORK: 
What do you see as your role in the team? 
Who are the other people on your team, and how would you describe their roles?  
What are some things you did to make sure that you kept up to date on what your other 
team members were doing? 
How would you characterize the amount of interaction on your team: not enough, just 
right, or more than enough? 
Example of interaction that worked:   
Well?  
Can you think of any kind of interaction that didn‘t work so well?  
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CLIENT INTERACTION: 
How would you characterize the amount of interaction with the client: not enough, just 
right, or more than enough? 
 
Example of interaction that worked well, not well – things learned from client – things 
explained to client.   
Describe what you‘ve done in keeping your client up to date on what you‘re doing.  
 
USER INFO: 
Describe the typical user of your product, as the client has described him/her.   
  Can you think of other kinds of users, different levels of users? 
Give me a story or stories about someone using your product.  
Think of a scenario of how you imagine your product will be used – ―use case.‖ 
What will users be able to do with your product that they can‘t currently do without it? 
How will users benefit from your product?  
What kind of advantage will it give them? 
How will it make their tasks/job easier?  
What knowledge and skills are you assuming your users will have before using your 
product? 
What do you think will be the hardest aspect of your product for a user to learn? 
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Appendix 2-Permissions 
Permission for: Speaking of Software: Case Studies in Software 
Communication.  
 
With Marika Seigel and Charles Wallace. In ―Software Engineering: Effective Teaching 
and Learning Approaches and Practice‖. Heidi Ellis, Steve Demurjian, Fernando Naveda, 
editors. IGI Global Publishing, Hershey, PA. October 2008 
 
Selections appear in modified form throughout this dissertation. 
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Permission for: Making and Acting: Ethnographic Development of a Case 
Study.  
 
With Marika Seigel and Charles Wallace. In ―Qualitative Research in Technical 
Communication‖. James Conklin and George F. Hayhoe, editors. Routledge, NY. 2011 
 
Selections appear in modified form in Chapter Three: Theory Applied and Chapter Five: 
Project specific Methods. 
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